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BRAVE NEWWORLD: A POST-CORONAVIRUS
PERSPECTIVE ON TRADE
Kevin J. Fandl*
Trade policy during the Obama Administration largely reflected the
pinnacle of the globalist moment in history. The dream of global
peace through economic security was on the cusp of being achieved,
with a comprehensive set of trade alliances linking countries both
economically and politically to one another, a worldwide system of
rules which nearly all countries abided in their economic
relationships, and a deeply integrated global supply chain that not
only enabled companies to satisfy consumer demands at exceedingly
low cost and rapid development, but also empowered more and
more workers in poor countries to join the global economy. This had
been the pursuit of the progressive politicians in the early twentieth
century at the start of the modern global era—the liberal world
order. All of this began to visibly crumble with the election of
Donald Trump in 2016. His promises of cutting ties with trading
partners that did not give the United States a fair deal and
relinquishing global leadership in exchange for national
sovereignty struck a chord with American voters. Voters understood
that the institutions we built had failed them in some fashion and
saw the America First policies of Mr. Trump as the answer to their
economic woes. The economic protectionism that has taken place
during the Trump Administration has not been seen since the 1930s,
just before the outbreak of World War II. Withdrawal from
international institutions, trade wars with friends and foes,
immigration bans, and a general disregard for diplomacy, are
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indicative of America’s withdrawal from the liberal economic order
that it built to help the world recover after World War II. The
Coronavirus and subsequent global economic collapse hastened the
negative economic fallout from these actions; however, the belief
that America should go it alone has been rising for decades. In the
past, legislators and the executive have exercised restraint,
understanding the dramatic effects that a world without U.S.
leadership would have on American and global economic growth
and peace. With that restraint now gone, we are proceeding at full
speed toward the destruction of the liberal world order. In this short
paper, I argue that precisely at a moment of crisis like that presented
by a global health pandemic, it is the rules-based international
order that has the best chance of slowing the slide toward
authoritarianism and global recession. My contribution is focused
on the economic policies inherent in the liberal world order and how
those have guided us toward strong and sustainable economic
growth for seventy-five years. Without American leadership at the
helm, chances for survival of that order and the economic prosperity
that it brought are dim.
INTRODUCTION
The start of the second decade of the second millennium was
unlike what anyone had expected. The year opened with a divisive
trade war between the United States and most of the world, with
China as a central target. A highly contagious virus spread rapidly
from China throughout the rest of the world, causing hundreds of
thousands of deaths and mass lockdowns. And the world teetered on
the edge of global economic collapse as global supply chains broke
down, consumer demand evaporated, and stores of all sizes threw in
the towel. Not since World War II had a threat to the livelihoods of
so many individuals been so great.
At a similarly momentous and dark time in our recent history,
America joined its victorious World War II allies in a show of
leadership and cooperation. They vowed to build a world order
premised on the ideals of democracy, rule of law, and freedom and
to secure the world against the horrors of war and economic
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collapse.1 The equivalent moment in 2020 has taken the world in the
opposite direction, withdrawing the United States from its position
of global leadership in an active effort to undermine the very
institutions that have kept the peace for so long. Scholar Robert
Kagan predicted this moment in his book, The Jungle Grows Back,
where he cogently argues that the creators of the liberal world order
in the twentieth century, the United States in particular, have failed
to tend to the global garden and allowed “the jungle” of nationalism,
unilateralism, and tribalism to creep back in.2
The legal and policy decisions of the Trump Administration,
from withdrawal from international institutions to unilateral trade
wars with friends and foes alike, have been costly for the global
economy. But perhaps more importantly, these actions, which
garner significant public support, have highlighted the withered
support remaining for American leadership in the global economy.3
The most concerning element of the move away from globalism and
toward nationalism is the possibility that this is not a temporary blip
in the history of liberalism but rather the emergence of a new world
order—one in which the United States plays a supporting role, at
best.
1 See, e.g., Tim Wallace, Why the World Needs a New Bretton Woods
Moment, THE TELEGRAPH (May 27, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://
www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2020/05/27/world-needs-new-bretton-woods-
moment (discussing the creation of the Bretton Woods institutions in 1944).
2 See generally, ROBERT KAGAN, THE JUNGLE GROWS BACK (2018).
3 See Ian Bremmer, The Era of American Global Leadership Is Over. Here’s
What Comes Next, TIME (Dec. 19, 2016), https://time.com/4606071/american-
global-leadership-is-over (describing the Trump Administration’s approach to
American withdrawal from the global economy).
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The move toward nationalism is visible in a number of segments
of society, including global security,4 health,5 and immigration.6 But
perhaps nowhere is it more evident than in the trade arena.
Candidate Donald Trump ran on a platform of bringing jobs back to
America,7 renegotiating trade deals on more favorable terms,
aggressively pursuing unfair actions by China, and withdrawing
from President Obama’s crowning achievement in trade, the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (“TPP”). He laid out his plan in June 2016 in a
speech entitled, “Declaring American Economic Independence.”8 In
that same speech, Trump called the WTO “disastrous.”9
After being elected, President Trump followed through on his
campaign promises to launch a trade war to try and bring companies
4 See, e.g., David Reid, Three Charts that Show Why Trump Thinks NATO Is
a Bad Deal, CNBC (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/03/three-
charts-that-show-why-trump-thinks-nato-is-a-bad-deal.html (providing context
for the Trump Administration’s concerns over the viability of NATO); Philip
Stephens, Donald Trump’s Retreat Is the Greatest Threat to Global Security, FIN.
TIMES (June 14, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/c607dbe4-6f09-11e8-852d-
d8b934ff5ffa (suggesting that U.S. withdrawal from global leadership opens the
door to alternate actors, such as Russia or China); Ryan Browne & Zachary
Cohen, US to Withdraw Nearly 12,000 Troops from Germany in Move that Will
Cost Billions and Take Years, CNN (July 29, 2020), https://www.cnn.com
/2020/07/29/politics/us-withdraw-troops-germany/index.html (discussing the
U.S. decision to withdraw troops stationed in Germany as part of NATO).
5 See, e.g., Berkeley Lovelace Jr., Trump Says the U.S. Will Cut Ties with
World Health Organization, CNBC (May 29, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com
/2020/05/29/trump-says-the-us-will-cut-ties-with-world-health-
organization.html (discussing Trump’s withdrawal from the World Health
Organization).
6 See, e.g., Michael D. Shear & Miriam Jordan, Trump Suspends Visas
Allowing Hundreds of Thousands of Foreigners to Work in the U.S., N.Y. TIMES
(July 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/22/us/politics/trump-h1b-
work-visas.html (explaining the Trump Administration’s decision to suspend the
issuance of visas for high-skill foreign workers).
7 Charlotte Alter, Transcript: Read the Full Text of the Fourth Republican
Debate in Milwaukee, TIME (Nov. 11, 2015, 7:34 AM), https://time.com/4107636
/transcript-read-the-full-text-of-the-fourth-republican-debate-in-milwaukee
(explaining Trump’s position of bringing jobs back to the United States).
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back to the United States, withdrew from the TPP,10 and pursued
economic sanctions against China for their unfair trade practices.11
He renegotiated the U.S.-Korea free trade agreement (“KORUS”)12
and the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”),13 now
known as the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (“USMCA”). And
he continued the freeze on the appointment of WTOAppellate Body
judges, effectively stunting that organization.14 These actions have
hurt consumers as well as producers, from farmers to manufacturers,
and damaged relationships with our trading partners.15
10 Presidential Memorandum Regarding Withdrawal of the United States
from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Agreement, PRESIDENTIAL
MEMORANDA (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions
/presidential-memorandum-regarding-withdrawal-united-states-trans-pacific-
partnership-negotiations-agreement.
11 See Krishnadev Calamur, Trump Has Already Started Four Trade Wars—
and Counting, THE ATLANTIC (July 6, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com
/international/archive/2018/07/us-china-tariffs/564440 (discussing the Section
301 tariffs levied on China).
12 See Simon Lester, Inu Manak & Kyounghwa Kim, Trump’s First Trade
Deal: The Slightly Revised Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, CATO INST. FREE
TRADEBULLETINNO. 73 (June 13, 2019), https://www.cato.org/publications/free-
trade-bulletin/trumps-first-trade-deal-slightly-revised-korea-us-free-trade.
13 See Mary E. Lovely & Jeffrey J. Schott, The USMCA: New, Modestly
Improved, but Still Costly, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (Dec. 17, 2019, 5:00
AM), https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/usmca-
new-modestly-improved-still-costly (discussing the changes that the USMCA
made to the original NAFTA agreement).
14 See Jennifer Anne Hillman, A Reset of the World Trade Organization’s
Appellate Body, COUNCIL ON FOR. REL. (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.cfr.org
/report/reset-world-trade-organizations-appellate-body (describing the blockade
of new judges to the WTO’s Appellate Body, which began under President
Obama, albeit for different policy reasons).
15 See, e.g., Josh Zumbrun & Bob Davis, China Trade War Didn’t Boost U.S.
Manufacturing Might, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 25, 2020, 3:36 PM), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/china-trade-war-didnt-boost-u-s-manufacturing-might-
11603618203 (describing the negative impact of the trade war on U.S.
manufacturing); Menzie Chinn & Bill Plumley, What Is the Toll of Trade Wars
on U.S. Agriculture?, PBS NEWS HOUR (Jan. 16, 2020, 1:06 PM), https://
www.pbs.org/newshour/economy/making-sense/what-is-the-toll-of-trade-wars-
on-u-s-agriculture (discussing weakened U.S. agricultural exports since the start
of the trade war).
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In the liberal world order, the vision of trade is based upon a
concept of rules, interdependence, and equality of access to markets.
Arising from the ashes of a protectionist empire that collapsed under
the weight of tariffs and non-intervention, the liberal approach
attempted to tie countries together into a rules-based system in
which all countries would benefit more from open trade and
following the rules than they would if they operated unilaterally. It
was an ingenious tool to smooth trade tensions and deflect conflicts
into a universally agreed upon set of rules. It was, in effect, trade
democracy. And it may be the lynchpin holding the liberal world
order together.
This paper is not about trade in the Trump era. It is not a critique
or criticism of the actions taken by a single protectionist executive
to see his own personal agenda implemented on a global stage.
Rather, I hope to use this paper to forecast the world ahead, taking
into account the road that we have traveled and predicting our next
destination. To do so, I will take us through a brief history of the
liberal world order to get better acquainted with how and why it was
built over the last seventy-five years. I will focus principally on trade
law and policy throughout that period, from the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) through the TPP. I will talk also
about the fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of China to provide
context for the changing nature of U.S. leadership of the liberal
world order and how a more powerful China might affect the future
of trade. In my analysis section, I will explore recent trends in trade,
from the movement of global supply chains to the build-up of
regional trade agreements to the future of the WTO. With these
trends, I will attempt to construct a view of the global trade system
after the pandemic, a world that I surmise will be far more realist
and skeptical toward liberal values than before.
I. HOWDIDWEGET HERE?
In his 1980 song, Once in a Lifetime, singer David Byrne of the
musical group the Talking Heads observed the successes all around
him—a beautiful house, a beautiful wife—and famously asked,
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“how did I get here?”16 Forty years later, we might ask the same
question about the economic prosperity that many of us take
advantage of today—how did we get here? It seems that the “elites,”
who benefit the most from globalization, took for granted that
working class Americans were satisfied with the way things were
going and that they would not object to the comparatively slow pace
of their economic growth compared to that of the upper class. The
technocrats at the helm of government presumed that everyone
recognized the role that globalization played in bringing prosperity
and peace to the world and that they would turn a blind eye to the
job losses associated with outsourcing and immigration, the
downward pressure on wages from foreign competition, and the
exploding economic deficit leading to cuts in social programs. They
were mistaken.
The 2016 election of Donald Trump—and the positions of all
major parties on trade during the 2016 election—17revealed what
many economists and policymakers had not expected—Americans
were willing to abandon the idea of free trade in the interest of
potential domestic economic security.18 For the first time in recent
history, presidential candidates from the right, left, and even the
extreme left, proudly asserted their doubts about the benefits of
continued expansion of free trade.19 American economic growth had
16 See Talking Heads, Once in a Lifetime, GENIUS, https://genius.com
/Talking-heads-once-in-a-lifetime-lyrics (last visited Nov. 17, 2020) (“And you
may find yourself in a beautiful house, with a beautiful wife[,] [a]nd you may ask
yourself, ‘Well . . . how did I get here?’”).
17 See John Brinkley, Why is Trade Such a Big Deal in the Election
Campaign?, FORBES (Mar. 3, 2016, 10:19 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites
/johnbrinkley/2016/03/03/why-is-trade-such-a-big-deal-in-the-election-
campaign/?sh=57906822331d.
18 See Donald Trump’s Economic Promises, BBC NEWS (Nov. 9, 2016),
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-37921635.
19 See Ewan Roy, What Are the U.S. Presidential Candidates Saying About
International Trade?, TRADE READY (Mar. 15, 2016), http://www.tradeready.ca
/2016/trade-takeaways/u-s-presidential-candidates-saying-international-trade/
(explaining how all of the major 2016 presidential candidates supported
withdrawing from the recently negotiated Trans-Pacific Partnership trade
agreement).
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slowed20 and more and more jobs had disappeared, especially in the
manufacturing sector,21 leading many Americans to question the
validity of the liberal economic order (perhaps without using those
words). Successful politicians tapped into this sentiment and began
making aggressive cases against globalization, outsourcing, the
WTO, and other components of the liberal world order. The race to
turn back the clock on globalization had begun.
II. THE LIBERALWORLD ORDER: PEACE THROUGH TRADE
In his 1933 inaugural address, Franklin Delano Roosevelt told
Americans, “[o]ur international trade relations, though vastly
important, are, in point of time and necessity, secondary to the
establishment of a sound national economy.”22 Eight years later, he
would be sending Americans into war to protect the very values that
he advocated at home—freedom, security, and democracy. By 1944,
FDR was leading the push for international security through the
creation of liberal institutions backed by American firepower.
The term “liberal world order” was not used to describe the
system that the United States and its allies had built in the early
twentieth century. The term itself is largely associated with
international relations scholar, G. John Ikenberry, who described it
in the 1990s as a form of “structural liberalism.”23 Ikenberry
asserted that, following the second World War, “the United States
and its allies created a political, economic, and strategic order that
was explicitly conceived as a solution to the problems that led to the
depression and world war.”24 He went on to explain how liberalism
20 U.S. Economic Growth Slowed in 2016 to 1.6%, CBS NEWS (Jan. 27,
2017), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/u-s-economic-growth-slowed-in-2016-
to-1-9 (explaining that economic growth in 2016 was the lowest since 2011).
21 See Martin N. Baily & Barry P. Bosworth, US Manufacturing:
Understanding its Past and its Potential Future, 28 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 3, 4–6
(2014) (arguing that, while overall manufacturing in the U.S. has remained steady,
most of that is driven by computers and electronics).
22 Franklin Delano Roosevelt, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1933)
(transcript available in the Yale Law School’s Avalon Project Library).
23 See, e.g., Daniel Deudney & G. John Ikenberry, The Nature and Sources
of Liberal International Order, 25 REV. OF INT’L STUD. 179, 180–82 (1999).
24 Id. at 180.
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itself was inadequate to describe this new order, which went beyond
the ideas of promoting democracy and capitalism and instead
created an interdependent system that tied the gains of one to the
gains of all.25 This system included “transnational relations” and
U.S. leadership as integral components.26
The primary elements of the liberal world order include: (1)
institutions that promote and protect a rules-based system;27 (2) rule
of law;28 (3) U.S.-led security alliances;29 (4) capitalism and free
market-orientation,30 and; (5) liberal democracy. Without a doubt,
these concepts paint the world quite differently from the way the
realists might see it. Liberalism focuses on cooperation rather than
competition, integration rather than isolation, and trade rather than
war. These foci have been the justification for decades of American
intervention in foreign conflicts from Korea to Vietnam to Iraq.
They have been the concepts utilized to build the modern world
trade system we rely upon today. And they have contained
innumerable threats from North Korea to Iran to terrorists in
Afghanistan, from spreading far beyond their borders.31
Yet there is a common misconception about the origins of the
liberal world order. It is often assumed that the United States sought
to assert its righteousness upon the world and to pursue its own
interests at any cost. This assumption may be best linked to
President Woodrow Wilson, who planted the seed for the modern
liberal world order in 1918, when he traveled to Europe at the end
of the Great War. In his famous “Fourteen Points” speech that year,
25 Id. at 180–83.
26 Id. at 186 (“Far from being ancillary or derivative, transnational relations
are a vital component of the operation of this system.”).
27 See id. at 182 (discussing the related concept of “security co-binding”).
See also Daniel H. Deudney, The Philadelphian System: Sovereignty, Arms
Control, and Balance of Power in the American States-Union, Circa 1787–1861,
49 INT’L ORG. (Spring 1995).
28 Deudney & Ikenberry, supra note 23, at 192 (referring to “civic identity”
as a set of common norms agreed upon by the Western political order).
29 See id. at 185 (justifying the consensual and non-coercive based leadership
of the United States in the liberal world order).
30 See id. at 190 (explaining the importance of “advanced capitalism,” which
creates high prospects for economic gains, and also promotes free trade as a means
of pursuing economic and political openness).
31 G. JOHN IKENBERRY, AWORLD SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY 194–95 (2020).
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Wilson advocated for a peaceful world unified in democratic
principles and territorial integrity, facilitated by the equalizing
League of Nations.32
Wilson’s moral compass was pointed in the right direction, but
his political naivete was reflected in the many compromises made
through the Treaty of Versailles, the ultimate collapse of the League
of Nations, and the onset of World War II.33 It would be decades
before his liberal vision would be realized.
The interceding years between the Wilson Administration and
the Administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt were filled with scandal
and ineffectiveness. Warren Harding, who followed Wilson in
office, filled positions with his friends, kept the United States out of
the League of Nations, and died (from a heart attack) in the midst of
the “teapot dome” scandal involving oil leases in Wyoming.34
Calvin Coolidge followed Harding and attempted to restore
confidence in the White House with a quiet, conservative approach
to politics. One of his principal achievements was passage of the
Immigration Act of 1924, which restricted immigration from Asia,
and a continued abstention from the United States joining the
League of Nations.35 Lastly was President Herbert Hoover, who
may have unintentionally become the most important figure in
establishing the liberal world order. Hoover in many ways embodied
the approach of the Trump Administration in its support for minimal
federal government intervention, support for states’ rights, and a
strong belief in individualism.36
The interwar period between World Wars I and II was a period
of retraction from the global stage. The American lives lost during
the Great War left a bad taste in the mouths of many Americans for
32 President Woodrow Wilson, Fourteen Points Speech (Jan. 8, 1918)
(transcript available in the Yale Law School’s Avalon Project Library).
33 See, e.g., Colin Dueck, Hegemony on the Cheap: Liberal Internationalism
from Wilson to Bush, 20 WORLD POLICY J. 1, 2–3 (2003–2004).
34 Warren G. Harding, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-
the-white-house/presidents/warren-g-harding/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2021).
35 The Immigration Act of 1924 (The Johnson-Reed Act), OFF. OF THE
HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/immigration-act (last
visited Jan. 7, 2021).
36 David E. Hamilton, Herbert Hoover: Life in Brief, MILLER CENTER,
https://millercenter.org/president/hoover/life-in-brief (last visited Nov. 18, 2020).
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international diplomacy. Nationalist sentiment prevailed and
America withdrew from the world. “This ruinous decision to step
away from responsibility and decline the mantle of leadership
directly paved the way for World War II, and it symbolized the high
price of American neglect of international relations during the 1920s
and 1930s.”37 The American nationalist position was cemented with
its refusal to join the League of Nations and its hesitance to enter
World War II.
At home, the 1920s and early 1930s in the United States were
also a time of optimism, growing wealth, and rapid
industrialization.38 Yet they were a time of tremendous increases in
inequality, a concentration of wealth among a select few
industrialists, and wild speculation on markets. President Hoover
was warned about this speculation but, given his focus on laissez-
faire economics and minimal government intervention, chose not to
intervene in the market.39 Market speculation drove the stock market
to its highest level ever in September 1929. Consumers were taking
on more risks by financing major purchases, such as automobiles,
and firms were taking on credit under the belief that the market
would only continue to rise.40
Highly leveraged banks, following the optimism of the day,
invested heavily in utilities stocks using debt to make such
investments. As word got out that new regulations of those utilities
would be coming, and federal interest rates began to rise, restricting
access to credit, nervous investors began to withdraw their money
from the banks. On Black Thursday (October 24, 1929) and Black
Tuesday (October 29, 1929), mass selloffs compromised the
viability of many banks and led the stock market to drop to 248 by
37 Jessica Wang, Looking Forward in a Failing World: Adolf A. Berle, Jr.,
the United States, and Global Order in the Interwar Years, 42 SEATTLEU. L. REV.
385, 388 (2019).
38 See, e.g., Gary Richardson et al., Stock Market Crash of 1929, FED. RES.
HIST. (Nov. 22, 2013), https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/stock
_market_crash_of_1929 (explaining that the value of the stock market during the
“roaring twenties” rose from 63 in August 1921 to 381 in September 1929).
39 See MARTIN L. FAUSOLD, THE PRESIDENCY OF HERBERT C. HOOVER 68–
71 (3rd ed. 1985).
40 Richardson et al., supra note 38 (describing the actions of the Federal
Reserve leading up to, and following, the 1929 stock market crash).
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the end of the year. This continued unabated until the market lost
90% of its value by the end of 1932.41 The market would not recover
fully until 1954.42
President Hoover took a number of immediate steps to try and
reverse the dramatic economic collapse that was rapidly unfolding
in the previously optimism-heavy America. Given the limited
powers of the federal government at the time, Hoover’s main
weapon to combat the crisis was to encourage states to take action.
He did so by creating a commission on employment that would
coordinate state and local relief efforts, though this had limited
success.43 In 1932, Hoover created the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation to make emergency loans to businesses in fear of
default.44 He secured congressional funding for this program via the
Emergency Relief Construction Act in July 1932.45
A. The Great Tariff Mistake
The actions of the Hoover Administration to respond to the
economic crisis of the 1930s are largely similar to those of the
Trump Administration’s response to the economic crisis of the
2020s. Both Presidents took a hands-off approach that sought
voluntary actions by states, localities, and the private sector. Both
contended that self-reliance and resilience would get Americans
through the crisis.46 And both downplayed the depth and length of
41 The New York Stock Market Crash of 1929 Preludes the Great Depression,
GOLDMAN SACHS, https://www.goldmansachs.com/our-firm/history/moments
/1929-financial-crash.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2020).
42 See Richardson, et al., supra note 38.
43 Herbert Hoover Presidential Library and Museum, The Great Depression,
NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://hoover.archives.gov/exhibits/great-depression (last
visited Nov. 13, 2020) (discussing the creation of the President’s Emergency
Committee for Employment in 1930).
44 The Great Depression, THE AM. YAWP, http://www.americanyawp.com
/text/23-the-great-depression/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2020).
45 Emergency Relief and Construction Act of 1932, H.R. 9642, 72nd Cong.
§ 1 (1932).
46 Compare Herbert Hoover on the Great Depression and New Deal, 1931–
1933, GILDER LEHRMAN INST. OF AM. HIST., https://www.gilderlehrman.org
/history-resources/spotlight-primary-source/herbert-hoover-great-depression-
and-new-deal-1931–1933 (last visited Nov. 12, 2020) (explaining Hoover’s
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the economic pain.47 Unemployment in 1933 reached 24.9% and
GDP shrunk to −8.5% in 1930.48 In April 2020, unemployment
reached 14.7%49 and GDP for the first quarter of 2020 declined to
−4.8%.50 At the time of this writing, those numbers are widely
expected to worsen.
However, Hoover also signed into law the Tariff Act of 1930,
which dramatically thwarted growth in international trade.51 The
Act, commonly known as the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, was
proposed before the stock market crash at the behest of Republicans
refusal to engage federal resources in the midst of the Great Depression), with
Michael D. Shear et al., Inside Trump’s Failure: The Rush to Abandon Leadership
Role on the Virus, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com
/2020/07/18/us/politics/trump-coronavirus-response-failure-leadership.html
(describing Trump’s push for states to take action to reopen their economies in
the face of high risks from the Coronavirus); see also Kate Bennett, New Ivanka
Trump Initiative Tells Out-of-Work Americans to ‘Find Something New’, CNN
(July 14, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/14/politics/ivanka-trump-find-
something-new-unemployment/index.html (discussing the first daughter’s
initiative to push the unemployed into different positions).
47 Compare American Experience, The Great Depression, PBS,
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/dustbowl-great-
depression/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2020) (recalling Hoover’s reference to the Great
Depression as a “passing incident in our national lives”), with Jesse Hellmann,
Trump Downplaying Sparks New Criticism of COVID-19 Response, THE HILL
(July 6, 2020, 4:13 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/506075-trump-
downplaying-sparks-new-criticism-of-covid-19-response (scrutinizing Trump’s
lack of attention to the effects of the Coronavirus on the economy).
48 See Kimberly Amadeo & Somer G. Anderson, Unemployment Rate by
Year Since 1929 Compared to Inflation and GDP, THE BALANCE,
https://www.thebalance.com/unemployment-rate-by-year-3305506 (last updated
Sept. 17, 2020) (providing unemployment and GDP data for every year since
1929).
49 TED: The Economics Daily, Unemployment Rate Rises to Record High
14.7 Percent in April 2020, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (May 13, 2020),
https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2020/unemployment-rate-rises-to-record-high-14-
point-7-percent-in-april-2020.htm.
50 Gross Domestic Product, 1st Quarter 2020 (Advance Estimate), U.S.
BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS (Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.bea.gov/news/2020
/gross-domestic-product-1st-quarter-2020-advance-estimate.
51 Leonard Silk, Protectionist Mood: Mounting Pressure Smoot and Hawley,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 1985), https://www.nytimes.com/1985/09/17/business
/protectionist-mood-mounting-pressure-smoot-and-hawley.html.
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and special interests seeking tariff protection in the face of rising
competition.52 Centrist Republicans defeated the first attempt to
raise tariffs in 1929, but once the stock market collapsed and
unemployment soared, Hoover had the political support that he
needed to enact the Bill. Some have argued that Hoover supported
the Bill because it included desired revisions to the Fordney-
McCumber Tariff Act of 1922 (“FTC”), which empowered the
Executive to set tariff rates through the use of an independent
commission.53 Yet the opposition of the business and economist
communities, along with democrats in Congress, nearly sunk the
law.54 The Bill passed in the Senate by a vote of 44 to 42 (5
democrats in support) and the House by a vote of 222 to 153 (14
democrats in support).55
Passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 included
protection for its intended target—farmers—as well as numerous
other special interests that did not want to be left outside the
government’s protectionist umbrella.56 Tariffs increased to an
average of 20%, making foreign imports more expensive and thus
52 See, e.g., Kumiko Koyama, The Passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act:
Why Did the President Sign the Bill?, 21 J. OF POL’Y HIST. 163, 178–79 (2009)
(describing Hoover’s overarching push to revise existing trade legislation long
before Smoot-Hawley).
53 Pub. L. No. 67-318, 42 Stat. 858 (1922). See also Kevin J. Fandl, National
Security Tariffs: A Threat to Effective Trade Policy, U. PA. BUS. L. J.
(forthcoming, 2021) (explaining the support of the Harding Administration for
these higher tariffs to protect against competing imports of agriculture).
54 See, e.g., John Steele Gordon, The Great Mistake, BARRON’S,
https://www.barrons.com/articles/SB50001424052970203952604575552230198
296558 (last updated Oct. 23, 2010) (quoting J.P. Morgan’s Thomas Lamont as
saying to Hoover at the time, “I almost went down on my knees . . . to beg Herbert
Hoover to veto the asinine Hawley-Smoot tariff. That act intensified nationalism
all over the world”; and Henry Ford who visited the White House and called the
bill “an economic stupidity”).
55 Will Kenton, Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, INVESTOPEDIA, https://
www.investopedia.com/terms/s/smoot-hawley-tariff-act.asp (last updated Sept. 5,
2020).
56 David Greene, Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act: A Classic Economics Horror
Story, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 5, 2018, 4:58 AM), https://www.npr.org
/2018/04/05/599707003/smoot-hawley-tariff-act-a-classic-economics-horror-
story (explaining that over 800 goods received some type of protection under the
Act).
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less competitive on the American market.57 As expected, this action
resulted in immediate retaliation, with many of our trading partners
raising tariffs on American exports, further weakening an already
floundering American economy.58 In the three-year period between
1929 and 1932, U.S. exports declined by 78%, from $5.24 billion to
$1.16 billion.59
It is important for readers to understand the economic position
of the United States at the time of passage of the Smoot-Hawley Act
in 1930. Only forty years prior, Representative and soon-to-be
President William McKinley crafted highly protective legislation in
the form of the McKinley Tariff Act of 1890.60 That Act raised the
average tariff on imports from 38% to 49.5%.61 Yet there was little
retaliation at the time because the United States was a largely
agricultural country, importing its manufactured goods from Europe
and exporting its basic commodities.62 This created a surplus for
European countries, exporting higher value manufactured goods and
importing agricultural goods from the United States.63 Their
retaliation against the high American tariffs had little effect since
the United States was not exporting manufactured goods—yet.64
By 1930, big change had arrived. America had become a major
manufacturing economy with over half of its exports constituting
manufactured goods.65 Accordingly, Europe now had ample
57 See Douglas A. Irwin, The Smoot-Hawley Tariff: A Quantitative
Assessment, 80 REV. OF ECON.& STAT. 326, 330–33 (1998) (expressing the trade-
weighted average change in tariffs following the Act).
58 See generally JOSEPH M. JONES, TARRIF RETALIATION: REPERCUSSIONS
OF THE HAWLEY-SMOOT BILL (Univ. of Pa. Press ed., 1934) (describing, chapter
by chapter, the responses of European countries to the Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act).
59 See Gordon, supra note 54.
60 The McKinley Tariff of 1890, HISTORY, ART &ARCHIVES, THE U.S. H. OF
REP., https://history.house.gov/Historical-Highlights/1851-1900/The-McKinley-
Tariff-of-1890/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2020).
61 Jay Chittooran, History Says Trade Protectionism Has Never Worked,
THIRD WAY (Sept. 12, 2016), https://www.thirdway.org/memo/history-says-
trade-protectionism-has-never-worked.
62 André Siegfried, European Reactions to American Tariff Proposals, FOR.
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ammunition to launch a defensive trade policy against America.66
And as Professor André Siegfried at the École Libre des Sciences
Politiques noted at the time, “the main factor in the formation of the
common consciousness becoming manifest today is the presence of
a powerful, rich and dominant United States. The spectacle of that
successful country is a lesson which cannot possibly be ignored. But
at the same time the fact that America is somewhat lacking in
international mindedness is a warning.”67
The critiques of both Siegfried and Jones in the early 1930s were
astute and prescient, anticipating not only the retaliation that would
come from passage of the Act, but also the changing economic
relationships developing rapidly in the early twentieth century.68
The United States was not only emerging as a major economic
player on the world stage, but also, following World War II, a major
political leader as well. This was not necessarily a role the United
States was looking to play; however, by the time of the election of
Franklin Roosevelt in 1932, it became apparent that the world was
becoming more interdependent than ever before and that it needed
direction and leadership.
The 1930s were a time of economic and political calamity as
well as a time of change. As the United States exploded onto the
scene as a major economic power, threats to democracy arose from
all corners, including the rise of Mussolini in Italy, Hitler in
Germany, and Franco in Spain, as well as across parts of Latin
America.69 Benito Mussolini’s rapid rise to power in 1922 created a
fanatical nationalism, capitalizing on the traumatic experiences of
Italian soldiers inWorldWar I and seeking to reinvigorate the nation
with powerful leadership that reflected the historical power of the
Roman Empire.70 Adolf Hitler followed Mussolini’s playbook,
66 See JONES, supra note 58, at 11–14 (providing a comprehensive analysis
of the tariff act and its associated defensive tariffs).
67 See Siegfried, supra note 62, at 19.
68 Id.
69 See, e.g., Olivia B. Waxman, What to Know About the Origins of
Fascism’s Brutal Ideology, TIME (Mar. 22, 2019, 2:46 PM), https://time.com
/5556242/what-is-fascism (explaining the origins of fascism).
70 See, e.g., David AJ Richards, Liberal Democracy and the Problem of
Patriarchy, 46 ISR. L. REV. 169, 187–88 (2013) (describing the role played by
masculinity in furthering violent oppression in Italy and Germany).
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mixing in anti-Semitism and anti-immigrant sentiments to create an
even more powerful fascist agenda that would lead to the loss of 85
million lives around the world.71
B. Betting on Liberal Trade
By the time of the 1932 election of Franklin Roosevelt, the threat
from the collapse of world trade and the ascent of fascism made it
abundantly clear that the new star on the global stage, America, had
to take a stand. But it is important to recognize that Americans were
not proactively asserting their position as a liberal democracy upon
the world in an effort to set globalization in motion; rather, they were
acting in defense of their own values and responding to a growing
and tremendous threat to freedom the world over. As G. John
Ikenberry noted in a recent article, “[t]he liberal order they went on
to build was less about the triumphant march of liberal democracy
than about pragmatic, cooperative solutions to the global dangers
arising from interdependence. Internationalism was not a project of
tearing down borders and globalizing the world; it was about
managing the growing complexities of economic and security
interdependence in the pursuit of national well-being.”72
The end of World War II ignited the liberal world order and
supercharged economic globalization. Defeat of the Nazi regime
and the Japanese imperialists showed the strength of the belief in
democracy and freedom. American support for global institutions
returned, enabling the establishment of the United Nations in 1945,
the Bretton Woods financial institutions in 1944,73 and the first set
of rules for international trade—the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (“GATT”) in 1947.74 These institutions, along with
American leadership and investment, sought to solidify the ideals
71 Id. at 189.
72 G. John Ikenberry, The Next Liberal Order, 99 FOREIGN AFF. 133 (2020)
(seeing Roosevelt as a defensive tactician rather than a globalist).
73 Consisting of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(World Bank) and the International Monetary Fund.
74 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1947, opened for signature Oct.
30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, as amended by Protocol to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Geneva 1979) at 3, GATT Doc.L/4875,
BISD (26th Supp. 1980).
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that the allies fought for during World War II—democracy,
freedom, and peace through economic trade and stability.
The United States quickly emerged as a global political leader,
establishing the Marshall Plan to both rebuild Europe and to ensure
European support of American global leadership. In 1949, the
Americans and Europeans entered into a strategic defense
agreement—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”)—to
provide for mutual defense of the allied member states.75 And thanks
to the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (“RTAA”) of 1934 in the
United States,76 America began negotiating bilateral trade
agreements to provide for preferential market access and to put into
practice the theory that trade promotes peace.77 The era of
interdependency in both political and economic relations had begun.
C. The Fall of the Soviet Union: U.S. Leadership Peaks
Despite fighting side by side during World War II, the Soviets
and the Americans had very different ideas about politics and
economics. Joseph Stalin’s Soviet Union was built on the heels of
the Russian Revolution of 1917 when Vladimir Lenin led the
overthrow of the long-standing monarchy. Stalin, like Lenin before
him, pursued a radical leftist agenda that included communist
principles, such as the elimination of private property and religion,
along with the collectivization of agriculture. Stalin helped the
Soviet Union to industrialize quickly and, following World War II,
to forge their own path forward with their communist allies.
By the end of World War II, after defeating Germany and Japan,
the Soviet Union began expanding its empire into Eastern Europe,
threatening American allies in Western Europe. A new distrust
emerged between the Americans and Soviets and the Cold War78
75 North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243
(entered into force Aug. 24, 1949).
76 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, ch. 474, § 1, 48 Stat. 943, 943–
44 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1351–54 (2018)).
77 See, e.g., Daniel Griswold, Peace on Earth, Free Trade for Men, CATO
INST. (Dec. 31, 1998), https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/peace-
earth-free-trade-men.
78 The term “Cold War” was first used by George Orwell in 1945. See
George Orwell, You and the Atomic Bomb, THE TRIB., Oct. 19, 1945.
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was set in motion. The United States pursued a policy of
“containment” to resist the advances of the Soviet Union and the
two nuclear powers fought proxy wars in North Korea, Vietnam and
Cuba, among other places.79 President Nixon attempted to thaw
relations with the Soviets with a détente and by forging a new
relationship with communist China to offset Soviet influence in the
region.80 This led to agreements to reduce nuclear arsenals81 and to
utilize diplomacy rather than force to calm relations.
The Reagan era (1981–1989) coincided with advances in
technology and lower costs for international trade. This, along with
significant tax reforms that worsened inequality but also stimulated
growth, led to the most rapid expansion in economic growth ever.82
On the contrary, the Soviet Union’s communist policies were failing
to produce sustainable growth, effectively exposing the economic
limits of communist policies. Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev,
who came to power in 1985, implemented radical economic and
political reforms, but it was too little, too late.83 President Reagan
took a hardline approach to the Soviets and, given their weakened
state, helped to foster the end of the Cold War.
President Reagan also, in many ways, signaled a low point in
liberal ideals. “After 1980, Democratic liberalism remained
79 See National Security Council Report, United States Objectives and
Programs for National Security, NSC 68, (Apr. 14, 1950) (explaining the theory
of containment).
80 See Kevin J. Fandl, Xi, Trump and the Death of the WTO, (forthcoming
2021) (providing an overview of the rationale behind Nixon’s rapprochement with
China).
81 Treaty Between the United States and the U.S.S.R. on the Limitation of
Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, Russ.-U.S. May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3435,
T.I.A.S. No. 7503 (1972).
82 SeeMartin Anderson, The Reagan Boom—The Greatest Ever, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 17, 1990), https://www.nytimes.com/1990/01/17/opinion/the-reagan-boom-
greatest-ever.html (“[T]he seven-year period from 1982 to 1989 was the greatest,
consistent burst of economic activity ever seen in the U.S. In fact, it was the
greatest economic expansion the world has ever seen—in any country, at any
time.”).
83 See, e.g., Chris Miller, Could Mikhail Gorbachev Have Saved the Soviet
Union?, FOREIGN POL’Y (Dec. 21, 2016), https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/21
/could-mikhail-gorbachev-have-saved-the-soviet-union (discussing Gorbachev’s
policies of glasnost (political openness) and perestroika (economic openness)).
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directionless and the party as a whole lacked credibility.”84 That
changed with the fall of the Iron Curtain and the end of the Cold
War that began in 1989.
The end of the Cold War meant the end to the bipolar power
structure that had prevailed for 45 years. As the sole superpower, the
United States needed a new justification for its foreign actions lest
they be considered imperialist.85 Following the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001 and the subsequent “war on terror,” for many
countries around the world, these imperialist fears were realized as
the United States pursued terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq, and in a
number of developing countries.86 This period in history threw
doubt on the continuation of the liberal world order as some saw it
as oppression and others—including many Americans—saw it as
outdated.
D. The Liberal “American” Order?
American withdrawal from the world stage is a logical response
to the dismantling of a world in which the only other superpower
advocating an alternative to the liberal model was the Soviet Union.
With the Soviets out of the picture, there was no perceived need for
an aggressive and widespread American presence in the world to
maintain peace.87 As Ikenberry explained more recently, the liberal
world order was a reaction to rising threats, principally from the
Soviet Union’s expansion of communist ideas around the world.88
So, once that threat had been neutralized, the United States no longer
84 Sean Wilentz, How Bill Clinton Saved Liberalism, NAT’L PUB. RADIO
(Oct. 4, 2011, 9:03 AM), https://www.npr.org/2011/10/04/141035627/new-
republic-how-bill-clinton-saved-liberalism (describing the floundering ideas of
the liberal agenda since the Vietnam War).
85 See NIALL FERGUSON, EMPIRE: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF THE BRITISH
WORLD ORDER AND THE LESSONS FOR GLOBAL POWER (2002) (comparing the
United States to the British Empire).
86 See G. John Ikenberry, Power and Liberal Order: America’s Postwar
World Order in Transition, 5 INT’L REL. OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC 133 (2005).
87 But see Joseph S. Nye, Jr.,What New World Order?, 71 FOREIGNAFF. 83,
95 (Spring 1992) (noting the very real possibility of another hostile threat rising
to control in Europe, as had happened multiple times before).
88 Ikenberry, supra note 86.
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needed to pursue a costly foreign policy agenda in lieu of its own
domestic goals. As Joseph Nye noted in 1992, “[t]here is no single
competitor to liberal capitalism as an overarching ideology.”89
As he announced the United States’ involvement in the Persian
Gulf in 1991, President George H.W. Bush announced that we had
entered a “new world order,” one with a single hegemon pursuing
the interests of the liberal world order unimpeded. But what this
reinterpretation of the liberal order meant was unclear. “In short the
new world order has begun. It is messy, evolving and not susceptible
to simple formulation or manipulation. Russia and China face
uncertain futures.”90 And it appeared that the American economy
was not ready for the next challenge to its unitary power.
By the end of the Cold War, America’s national savings rate fell
to 4.5% from a high of 7.5% in the 1970s. America’s education
system was not keeping up with the still nascent but rapidly
advancing move into technology. And American infrastructure was
crumbling and in need of significant investment.91 With the
perennial threat of the Soviets out of the way, Americans in the
1990s were able to refocus their efforts on domestic problems, most
importantly, the economy.
President Bill Clinton is sometimes referred to as the savior of
liberalism. Certainly, his record on welfare reform, fighting racism,
and investing in education were reminiscent of the progressive FDR
domestic agenda in the 1940s.92 However, Clinton’s singular focus
was on domestic investment, not on foreign affairs or pursuit of the
global ideals that informed the earlier progressive agenda.93 His
1992 campaign slogan, “It’s the economy, stupid,” reflected the
popular sentiment that the United States should retract from the
89 Nye, supra note 87, at 84.
90 Id. at 96 (describing the “new world order” as a blend of liberal values
combined with realist tactics).
91 Id. at 94.
92 Wilentz, supra note 84.
93 StephenM.Walt, Two Cheers for Clinton’s Foreign Affairs, 79 NO. 2 FOR.
AFF. 63–79 (Apr. 2000) (explaining that American distaste for a broader
international role led to the election of a Congress and a President with stronger
domestic agendas).
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world and fix its domestic problems.94 Likewise, the 1994
Republican sweep of Congress filled those halls with what we might
call anti-globalists, uninterested in supporting foreign wars or
international institutions.
Despite the domestic liberal reforms of the era, the 1990s also
saw an American withdrawal from the world stage, further
deepening the belief that a post-Cold War world did not require as
much investment in global affairs by the United States. President
Clinton pulled back from NATO, placing more responsibility on
Europeans to maintain security while not outright withdrawing
American support.95 Congress withheld funding for the United
Nations over their support of abortion.96 Congress also prevented
Clinton from attempting to normalize relations with Cuba, further
entrenching its communist neighbor to the South.97 And the United
States chose not to involve itself in foreign conflicts, including the
genocide in Rwanda in 1994.98
One area in which President Clinton was able to find some
success in foreign policy was with respect to China. China’s
assertion of power over its people in the 1989 Tiananmen Square
suppression of peaceful protesters epitomized its human rights
94 Id. at 68 (“Given the American public’s reluctance to take on ambitious
foreign policy goals and the potential calamity of an intervention gone awry,
Clinton’s approach was both prudent and appropriate.”).
95 Id. (describing the U.S. negotiation of the Dayton Accords as reflective of
the continuing U.S. commitment to peace in Europe).
96 The Leahy Amendment, Pub. L. No. 103-306, 108 Stat. 1612 (1994)
(preventing U.S. funding from being used to support abortions by international
organizations); see alsoNurith Aizenman, Citing Abortions in China, Trump Cuts
Funds for U.N. Family Planning Agency, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 4, 2017),
https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2017/04/04/522040557/citing-
abortions-in-china-trump-cuts-funds-for-u-n-family-planning-agency (discussing
the Trump Administration’s attempt to withhold $32.5 million in funding from
the United Nations over their support for abortion).
97 See Kevin J. Fandl, Adios Embargo: The Case for Executive Termination
of the U.S. Embargo on Cuba, 54 AM.BUS. L. J. 293–346 (Summer 2017) (tracing
the history of the U.S. economic embargos on Cuba).
98 Samantha Power, Bystanders to Genocide, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 2001),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/09/bystanders-to-
genocide/304571/ (reflecting on the “Clinton Apology” in 1998 for lack of
American assistance during the genocide in Rwanda).
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abuses, which did not coincide with the values of the liberal world
order. In response, Clinton worked to strengthen ties with Japan to
offset Chinese threats to Taiwan and greater East Asia.99 And,
following in the footsteps of his predecessor, Clinton attempted to
use trade restrictions to facilitate improvements in human rights in
China.100 By 1996, Clinton decoupled human rights from economic
issues, making the case that it would be more productive to work
with China on non-economic issues if it is a part of the liberal
economic system, which has more collective action power against a
rising China.101
Around the same time, two other significant developments in
trade were occurring. The first was the 1994 conclusion of the North
America Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”), which Congress
passed by large margins.102 The second was passage of the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act, which recognized the existence of the new
WTO that began operation in 1995.103 Thus, while the Clinton
Administration made a substantial turn inward to focus on domestic
policy, it maintained its support for the liberal world order
nevertheless.
We might say that the Clinton Administration was the first and
last attempt to turn Cold War investments around into domestic
investments. The economic rise of China in the 1990s and their
ultimate accession to the WTO in 2001 once again created a bipolar
global system, reestablishing the clear mission that the United States
had during the Cold War; however, rather than protecting
democracy and freedom, this time the United States would focus on
99 Walt, supra note 93.
100 See, e.g., President Clinton’s Visit to China in Context, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/legacy/campaigns/china-98/visit.htm (last visited
Nov. 20, 2020).
101 Full Text of Clinton’s Speech on China Trade Bill, INST. FOR AGRIC. &
TRADE POL’Y (Mar. 9, 2000), https://www.iatp.org/sites/default/files/Full_Text
_of_Clintons_Speech_on_China_Trade_Bi.htm (transcribing President Clinton’s
speech on normalizing trade relations with China).
102 Andrew Glass, Clinton Signs NAFTA into Law, Dec. 8, 1993, POLITICO
(Dec. 8, 2020, 7:02 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/12/08/clinton-
signs-nafta-into-law-dec-8-1993-1040789.
103 19 U.S.C. § 3511 (1994).
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protecting free and fair trade. I will discuss how China emerged in
this space in the next section.
III. AN EMERGING THREAT: CHINA
At the end of the Cold War in 1991, China was a growing but
still quite poor developing country. It was on track to becoming an
important component in the world trade system,104 but they were not
perceived as an economic threat by most of the world. The Republic
of China, which governed before the rise of Mao, had joined the
GATT as an original member in 1948. But the following year
brought China’s revolution and the new People’s Republic of China,
which governs today. The prior government withdrew from the
GATT and the new one did not join.
It was in 1986 that the People’s Republic of China expressed its
interest in joining the international trade body.105 China saw
membership in the GATT system as one of its economic policy
objectives.106 Since the 1949 revolution, China had been excluded
from the growing multilateral trade system, missing out on Most
Favored Nation (“MFN”) trading status, which would have afforded
China better terms of trade. They no longer wanted to be on the
outside looking in.107
104 See China’s Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and
Implications for the United States, Cong. Res. Serv., https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row
/RL33534.pdf (last updated June 25, 2019) (noting in its summary China’s
sustained growth over the years since “opening up to foreign trade and investment
and implementing free-market reforms in 1979”).
105 See Bilateral Agreement on China’s Entry into the WTO Between China
and the United States,MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF. OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604
_665547/t18051.shtml (last visited Nov. 20, 2020).
106 Meeting of the Working Party on the Accession of China: Statement by
H.E. Vice Minister Long Yongtu, Head of the Chinese Delegation, at the
Eighteenth Session of the Working Party on China, WTONEWS (Sept. 17, 2001),
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news01_e/wpchina_longstat_17sept01_e.h
tm.
107 See Chad P. Bown, U.S.-China Trade Conflicts and the Future of the
WTO, 33 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 27, 32 (2009) (describing the motivations
behind China’s push to join the WTO).
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A second reason for China to join the GATT system was to
facilitate its own internal economic reforms.108 Like all acceding
countries, China had to make substantial changes to its legal system
to come into conformity with the rules and commitments of the
GATT. In China’s case, a number of specific reforms were also
required, including liberalization of its financial services market,
reductions in agricultural subsidies, privatization of state-owned
enterprises and a commitment to protect intellectual property
rights.109 “When one takes into account the size of China’s
economy, its status as a developing country, and the degree to which
China (until very recently) operated as a planned economy, the
extent of China’s commitments are unprecedented.”110
China also may have wanted to join the liberal trade system at
this time because of the fallout from the Asian Financial Crisis in
1997.111 In his 2003 article, China scholar Nicholas Lardy argued
that China escaped much of the economic damage from the crisis
that its neighbors suffered because of China’s largely closed
economy.112 However, the economic crisis did expose the
weaknesses of China’s banking and financial systems and the
possibility of economic catastrophe if China opened to foreign
markets, which it would have to do given its slowing economy.
China’s response to the crisis was a commitment to offer assistance
to its neighbors while also pursuing significant economic reforms
domestically.113
108 Id. at 32–33 (suggesting that joining the GATT would offer China
benefits in exchange for reforms that it already planned to implement).
109 Id. (describing the commitments made by China to join the GATT/WTO).
110 Karen Halverson, China’s WTO Accession: Economic, Legal, and
Political Implications, 27 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 319, 326 (2004)
(describing the protocol of additional commitments made by China with the
United States in its accession process).
111 NICHOLAS R. LARDY, INTEGRATING CHINA INTO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
16 (2002).
112 Nicholas Lardy, The Case of China, BROOKINGS INST. (Mar. 1, 2003),
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-case-of-china/.
113 See generally Wayne Morrison, China’s Response to the Global
Financial Crisis: Implications for the United States, CONG. RES. SERV. (June 3,
2009), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22984.pdf (describing the risks posed to
China’s export-oriented economy for potential residual damage following the
Asian Financial Crisis).
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These three factors—desire for more foreign market access,
internal economic reforms and concerns over regional economic
crises—drove China toward the GATT with some sense of urgency.
The reforms that China committed to making, including a reduction
in the amount of support that its banking sector provided to state-
owned enterprises, and an opening of its financial services market
to foreign investment, would potentially improve domestic market
efficiency while also aligning China’s economy with the free
market-based principles of the liberal world order.114
When making its request to join the GATT, China was classified
by the World Bank as a low-income country. It would only move
slightly ahead to the category of low-middle income country eleven
years later, after the formation of the WTO.115 This enabled China
to accede to the WTO as a developing country, a status that is self-
designated according to WTO rules.116
Prior to its WTO accession, China operated outside of the global
GATT system, meaning that it was not able to take advantage of (or
offer others) most favored nation status. The favorable and
multilateral terms negotiated in the GATT rounds were out of reach
for China, just as China’s market was not subject to the rules of the
GATT system. However, this would not be a relevant issue for most
of the twentieth century, as China spent most of that century as a
developing country. When Richard Nixon announced his intention
to visit China, the reaction of the market was silence.117
114 Halverson, supra note 110, at 338–39 (describing the reforms to China’s
banking and financial services sectors).
115 See Brad Setser, U.S.-China Trade War: How We Got Here, COUNCIL ON
FOR. REL. (July 9, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/blog/us-china-trade-war-how-we-
got-here.
116 Who Are the Developing Countries in the WTO?, WTO NEWS,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/d1who_e.htm (last visited Aug.
20, 2020); J. Bacchus & I. Manak, The Development Dimension: What to Do
About Differential Treatment in Trade, CATO INST., POL’Y ANALYSIS NO. 887
(Apr. 13, 2020), https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/development-
dimension-what-do-about-differential-treatment-trade#introduction.
117 Leonard S. Silk, Nixon, China and Wall St., N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 1971),
https://www.nytimes.com/1971/07/21/archives/nixon-china-and-wall-st-why-
has-the-news-of-the-presidents-trip-had.html (“The news of President Nixon’s
coming trip to Communist China, sensational as it is politically, produced
virtually no effect on the stock market.”).
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At the start of the GATT Uruguay Round in 1986, which would
ultimately create the WTO, the United States and China each
exported about $4 billion in goods to one another.118 The United
States even had a trade surplus with China in the 1980s, while
simultaneously engaging in a trade war with Japan that generated a
substantial trade deficit with that country.119 The 1980s would be the
last time the United States would have a trade surplus with China.120
The reason this background on China’s economic relationship
with the United States is so important is that it underscores how
China was perceived by the West as it sought admittance to the
liberal economic system. Rather than posing a threat, China
presented an opportunity as a large, developing country for
American firms looking to lower labor costs. Prior to 1984, foreign
direct investment in China outside of Special Economic Zones was
prohibited. But a new law in 1984 opened the door to investment in
most economic sectors, creating new opportunities for American
and other foreign firms to operate in China.121
The new approach to trade encouraged by the 1986 Foreign
Investment Law in China emphasized investments in technology
and in export-oriented sectors.122 China was striving to become an
118 GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., U.S.-CHINA TRADE DISPUTES: RISING
TIDE, RISING STAKES 77 (2006).
119 China-U.S. Trade Issues, CONG. RES. SERV. (July 30, 2018),
https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL33536.html#_Toc520881911
(describing the trade patterns between the U.S. and China from 1980 through
2018); see also Clyde H. Farnsworth, Japan-U.S. Trade Gap $13.4 Billion, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 19, 1982), https://www.nytimes.com/1982/01/19/business/japan-us-
trade-gap-13.4-billion.html (describing the widening trade deficit the United
States had with Japan in the 1980s).
120 China-U.S. Trade Issues, CONG. RES. SERV. (July 30, 2018),
https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL33536.html#_Toc520881911
(describing the trade patterns between the U.S. and China from 1980 through
2018) (showing U.S. trade deficits with China since 1990).
121 Provisions of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China for the
Encouragement of Foreign Investment, promulgated by the State Council of the
People’s Republic of China on Oct. 11, 1986, reprinted in I COM. BUS. & TRADE
L. 171 (1987).
122 Carolyn P. Casey, The 1986 Provisions to Encourage Foreign Investment
in China: Further Evolution in Chinese Investment Laws, 2 AM. U. INT’L L. REV.
579, 582 (1987) (describing the investment provisions).
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export-oriented economy with a strong domestic manufacturing
base. Increased FDI in these sectors would help to facilitate that
goal.123 By the end of the 1990s, foreign firms accounted for over
half of Chinese export enterprises.124 FDI in China rose from $19
billion in 1990 to $300 billion by 1999.125
During this period of rapid growth and opportunity in China,
President Clinton, after a series of disputes in which non-GATT
remedies had to be applied, sought the powerful leverage that could
be applied if China were part of the multilateral trading system.126
Thus, Clinton took the first step—one that would damage him
politically—to bring China into the fold by normalizing U.S.-China
trade relations.127 President George W. Bush finalized the grant of
normalized trade relations with China on December 27, 2001.128
Defending his decision to support China’s accession to the
WTO, President Clinton noted:
By lowering the barriers that protect state-owned
industries, China is speeding a process that is
removing government from vast areas of people’s
lives. In the past, virtually every Chinese citizen
woke up in an apartment or a house owned by the
government, went to work in a factory or a farm run
by the government and read newspapers published
by the government. State-run workplaces also
123 See, e.g., Y.Y. Kueh, Foreign Investment and Economic Change in
China, 131 CHINA Q. 637 (1992) (explaining that FDI exposed China to foreign
trade while also helping them to grow their export economy).
124 Foreign Direct Investment—The China Story, WORLD BANK (July 16,
2010), https://www.shihang.org/zh/news/feature/2010/07/16/foreign-direct-
investment-china-story (reporting outcomes from the Chinese Ministry of
Commerce).
125 EDWARDM. GRAHAM&ERIKAWADA, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN
CHINA: EFFECTS ON GROWTH AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, in ACHIEVING
HIGH GROWTH: EXPERIENCE OF TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES IN EAST ASIA 2
(2001).
126 See Lael Brainard, Trade Policy in the 1990s, BROOKINGS INST. 1, 3 (June
29, 2001) (discussing the trade policy agenda of the Clinton Administration
toward China, among other things).
127 Clinton, supra note 101.
128 Press Release, White House, President Grants Permanent Trade Status to
China (Dec. 27, 2001) (taking effect on January 1, 2002).
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operated the schools where they sent their children,
the clinics where they received health care, [and] the
stores where they bought food. That systemwas a big
source of the Communist Party’s power. Now people
are leaving those firms, and when China joins the
W.T.O., they will leave them faster. The Chinese
government no longer will be everyone’s employer,
landlord, shopkeeper and nanny all rolled into one.129
Referring to the admission of China and Taiwan (which were
approved at the same time), then-U.S. Trade Representative Robert
Zoellick noted, “[b]oth [countries] are already major influences in
world trade. Their participation in the WTO will be a boost for us
and them.”130 When negotiations between China and the 142
Member States of the WTO concluded in September 2001, then-
Director General Michael Moore enthusiastically stated:
International economic cooperation has brought
about this defining moment in the history of the
multilateral trading system. With China’s
membership, theWTOwill take a major step towards
becoming a truly world organization. The near-
universal acceptance of its rules-based system will
serve a pivotal role in underpinning global economic
cooperation.131
The final 900-page text included far-reaching commitments for
China within the GATT rules-based system.132 Among other things,
China immediately joined the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property (“TRIPS”) Agreement and vowed to protect intellectual
property rights, and opened the door to foreign investment in the
129 Clinton’s Words on China: Trade Is the Smart Thing, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
9, 2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/03/09/world/clinton-s-words-on-china-
trade-is-the-smart-thing.html.
130 China Officially Joins WTO, CNN (Nov. 11, 2001, 1:17 AM), https://
www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/central/11/10/china.WTO/index.html.
131 WTO Successfully Concludes Negotiations on China’s Entry, WTO (Sept.
17, 2001), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr243_e.htm.
132 Christopher Duncan, Out of Conformity: China’s Capacity to Implement
World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Body Decisions After Accession,
18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 399, 405 (2002) (explaining the tremendous number of
legal changes that China had to make in order to accede to the WTO).
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form of joint venture agreements, elimination of agricultural export
subsidies, and a commitment to modify domestic laws to come into
conformity with the entireWTO agreement.133 To theWest, this was
a far-reaching commitment of China and a sign of its willingness to
operate within the liberal world order.
The hope for political reform in China following its accession to
the WTO was high but has largely faded today. At the time, it was
relatively clear to a liberal order-minded politician that once an
economy sees the benefits of openness on their economy, they will
have no choice but to spread that openness to the political system,
as President Clinton noted above.134 And to be clear, some political
reforms have been enacted, including tepid support for local
elections in rural China, broader access to information via the
internet and acceptance of non-governmental organizations.135
Even as recently as 2020, the signs that China sees no need for
political reform despite market liberalization are clear. That year
saw a peak of nearly 400 private Chinese firms mentioning Chinese
Premier Xi Jinping directly in their financial statements.136 In his
recent book, The State Strikes Back, economics scholar Nicholas
Lardy explained that the political reforms taking place post-WTO
accession largely ceased after the 2015 financial crisis, when China
reasserted central power to insulate its domestic market against
global economic shocks.137 Thus, while China has indeed benefited
from its limited economic liberalization and from the market access
provided through the WTO, their appetite for seemingly
unnecessary political reforms appears to be diminishing.
There is little doubt that China’s retraction from political reform
and their limited economic reforms have frustrated the hopeful
133 Id. at 405, 486.
134 Clinton, supra note 101.
135 Halverson, supra note 110 at 363–69 (discussing the limited political
reforms that have taken place in China).
136 Xi Jinping is Trying to Remake the Chinese Economy, THE ECONOMIST
(Aug. 15, 2020), (showing a rising trend in references to the Communist party—
and Mr. Xi in particular—in private financial statements).
137 NICHOLAS LARDY, THE STATE STRIKES BACK: THE END OF ECONOMIC
REFORM IN CHINA? 1 (2019).
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liberals in the West.138 This frustration has been exacerbated by
China’s growing economic muscle. China’s rapidly developing
export-oriented economy gave consumers from Brussels to Boston
access to cheap goods and gave firms access to cheap parts for their
assembly lines. Many American manufacturing firms were not able
to compete with the low-cost and often subsidized production in
China, causing them to lose market share. The result of increased
imports from China to meet the demand of American firms and
consumers, combined with low savings rates by Americans, was a
trade deficit with China.139
A. It’s Still the Economy, Stupid
As I discussed above, China’s economy took off in the 1990s
thanks in part to a rapid rise in foreign investment. But the 1990s
were not only a period of new investment in China—this was the
period in which global supply chains emerged, dramatically
reshaping the way that products were designed, manufactured, and
distributed.140 From containerization in the 1950s to lean production
in Japan in the 1980s to the modern, high-tech cloud-based global
supply chain system today, China emerged as a manufacturing
138 See, e.g., Evan S. Medeiros, The Changing Fundamentals of US-China
Relations, 42 WASH. Q. 93 (2019) (arguing that the U.S. has reached its limit of
patience in waiting for Chinese reforms); Steven Erlanger, Betraying Frustration
with China, E.U. Leaders Press for Progress on Trade Talks, N.Y. TIMES (June
22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/22/world/europe/china-eu-trade-
talks.html (describing European frustrations with delays on EU-China trade and
investment terms).
139 See Joseph Stiglitz, The US Is at Risk of Losing a Trade War with China,
PROJECT SYNDICATE (July 30, 2018), https://www.project-syndicate.org
/commentary/trump-loses-trade-war-with-china-by-joseph-e--stiglitz-2018-07
(explaining that an increase in tariffs on Chinese imports will not reduce the trade
deficit—Americans must save more in order to create a meaningful impact on the
deficit).
140 See, e.g., The History and Evolution of the Global Supply Chain, BLUME
GLOBAL, https://www.blumeglobal.com/learning/history-of-supply-chain/ (last
visited Aug. 25, 2020) (discussing the evolution of supply chains).
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center precisely in the right moment, and it has remained there ever
since.141
The trade deficit with China is a microcosm of the U.S. trade
balance with the entire world. As of April 2020, the United States
has a global trade deficit—that is, imports minus exports from and
to the entire world—of $49.4 billion.142 The trade deficit with China
in April 2020 was $25.96 billion.143 Of course, the U.S. trade deficit
with the entire world—which includes China—is offset by U.S.
exports to the rest of the world, including China. For instance, in the
first quarter of 2020, the United States had a trade surplus with
Brazil of nearly $9 billion.144
As I discuss in more detail below, highlighting a trade deficit
with a single country in order to show economic strength or
weakness is incomplete at best and dangerously deceptive at worst.
With China, because of the tremendous amount of U.S. foreign
direct investment there (approximately $7.6 billion or 2% of overall
FDI),145 and because most of those investments are in
manufacturing,146 a simple calculation of imports minus exports can
create a false image of the trade relationship. Consider the Apple
iPhone, which is manufactured and exported from China to the
141 See Sanjeev Sanyal, A Brief History of Supply Chains, THE GLOBALIST
(Mar. 22, 2012), https://www.theglobalist.com/a-brief-history-of-supply-chains/
(providing a history of global supply chains).
142 U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services, April 2020, BUREAU OF
ECON. ANALYSIS, https://www.bea.gov/news/2020/us-international-trade-goods-
and-services-april-2020 (last updated July 6, 2020).
143 Harriet Torry, U.S. Exports, Imports Fell Sharply in April Amid
Coronavirus Disruptions, WALL ST. J. (June 4, 2020, 1:13 PM), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-trade-deficit-likely-widened-in-april-amid-
coronavirus-disruptions-11591268401 (discussing the overall trade deficit as well
as the U.S. trade deficit with China and how the coronavirus may be affecting
those numbers).
144 BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, supra note 142.
145 U.S.-China Investment Ties: Overview and Issues for Congress, CONG.
RES. SERV. (Aug. 28, 2019), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF
/IF11283 (explaining the FDI balance between the United States in China and the
risks that it entails).
146 China: Foreign Investment, SANTANDER, https://santandertrade.com/en
/portal/establish-overseas/china/foreign-investment (last visited Aug. 25, 2020)
(explaining that nearly 26% of all FDI is invested in manufacturing in China).
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United States, adding approximately $15.7 billion to the trade
deficit.147 However, that number does not take into account the fact
that Apple primarily sources several of the components for the
iPhone from outside China, Korea and Japan, and that the vast
majority (estimated at 63%) of value comes from the intellectual
property owned by Apple, not the manufactured good itself.148 Once
again, global supply chains and the nature of international trade
today make trade deficits a poor measure of economic performance,
and yet they are driving the conversation about rethinking our role
in the global trading system.149
“The most important economic truth to grasp about the U.S.
trade deficit is that it has virtually nothing to do with trade
policy.”150 The trade balance between countries reflects the
competing levels of investment and savings within each country. If
one country saves and invests more domestically than the other, it
will tend to run a trade surplus with that other country.
147 Allison Schrager, The iPhone Alone Accounts for $15.7 Billion of US
Trade Deficit with China, QUARTZ (Mar. 21, 2018), https://qz.com/1234437/the-
iphone-alone-accounts-for-16-billion-of-the-us-trade-deficit-with-china/
(describing the impact of global supply chains on trade deficits).
148 Id. (explaining that out of the $1,000 cost for an iPhone X, the
manufactured cost is roughly $370.25).
149 See Keith Johnson, 5 Takeaways from Trump’s New China Trade Pact,
FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan. 16, 2020, 12:48 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/16
/trump-new-china-trade-pact-takeaways/ (suggesting that the key goal for Trump
is reducing the trade deficit with China, even though the January 2020 trade pact
may violate WTO rules); see also Nicholas R. Lardy, China and the WTO,
BROOKINGS INST. (Nov. 1, 1996), https://www.brookings.edu/research/china-
and-the-wto/ (explaining that U.S. policymakers intended to use China’s request
to join the WTO as leverage to reduce the new trade deficit that had developed in
the 1990s).
150 Daniel Griswold, America’s Misunderstood Trade Deficit, CATO INST.
(July 22, 1998), https://www.cato.org/publications/congressional-testimony
/americas-misunderstood-trade-deficit (providing clear testimony to Congress on
the lack of connection between a trade deficit and trade policy).
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Figure 1. United States-China Trade Balance (2002–2019). Source: Chao Deng,
In a Year of Trade War, U.S. Deficit With China Shrank, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 14,
2020).
Savings and investment rates around the world average about
20% of gross domestic product (“GDP”).151 However, China is an
outlier with an average savings rate of 46% in 2017 [see Figure 2
below]. This extraordinary savings rate is likely the result of several
factors, including the one-child policy and decollectivization of
agriculture under Deng in the 1980s, the shift from a centrally-
planned to a market-based economy and the resulting need to save
for social security in the 1990s, and the rapid growth caused by the
export boom post-WTO accession in the 2000s.152 Nearly all of this
saving is coming from individual households, not from the
government or corporate sector.153
151 Longmei Zhang et al., China’s High Savings: Drivers, Prospects, and
Policies, (IMF Working Papers, Working Paper No. 18/277, 2018).
152 Id. at 8–13 (providing a comprehensive analysis of the rationale behind
the high savings rate in China).
153 Id. at 9.
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Figure 2. Global Savings Rates in 2017. Source: Longmei Zhang, et al., China’s
High Savings: Drivers, Prospects, and Policies, IMF Working Paper No. 18/277
(2018).
What this tells us is that the U.S. trade deficit with China is not
caused by China’s unfair trade practices or refusal of market access,
but rather by the United States’ consumption and lack of savings
combined with Chinese non-consumption and significant savings.
The deficit does indeed reflect a problem for policymakers, but it is
not the problem that they think. Rather than focusing on sanctioning
Chinese exports (which will inevitably worsen the deficit in the
long-run),154 policymakers in the United States should be focused
on the lower-than-average American savings rate and take steps to
improve that.
In his testimony to Congress in 1998, trade economist Daniel
Griswold explained that one sure way to reduce a trade deficit would
be a recession—natural or artificial.155 A recession reduces levels of
investment and consumption, forcing consumers and firms to act
more cautiously by saving more. “If the trade deficit really is one of
our nation’s most pressing problems, the surest and swiftest way to
154 Griswold, supra note 150 (explaining that raising tariffs will ultimately
lead to a devaluation of the foreign currency, lowering the cost of their exports,
thereby increasing demand for those exports even in the face of higher tariffs).
155 Id.
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tackle it would be to engineer a deep recession.”156 His prediction
seems to be playing out in 2020 in the midst of the deep recession
growing out of the global health pandemic. In April 2020, savings
rates in the United States reached an all-time high of 33% as
consumption drops and consumers hold on to their capital.157
A recent Article by law professors Thomas Schoenbaum and
Daniel C.K. Chow eloquently explained the cause of trade deficits:
The underlying cause of the U.S. trade deficit is the
macroeconomic imbalance between the low U.S.
savings rate and the United States’ need for domestic
investment capital. Since U.S. domestic savings fall
far short of fulfilling the United States’ need for
capital, the U.S. economy is sustained by massive
amounts of foreign investment capital. The sources
of this investment capital are the dollars earned when
U.S. trading partners run trade surpluses with the
United States. Understanding these macroeconomic
facts is key to understanding trade imbalance
problems.158
The approach taken by the Trump Administration to address
concerns over the large and growing trade deficit with China is not
novel. It was tried by President Ronald Reagan when Japan was on
the rise and was becoming the world’s supplier of technology in the
1980s. In that situation, Reagan convinced Japan to accept certain
voluntary limits on their exports in order to protect the U.S.
economy.159 The result was an appreciation of the Yen and the
156 Id.
157 Maggie Fitzgerald, U.S. Savings Rate Hits Record 33% as Coronavirus
Causes Americans to Stockpile Cash, Curb Spending, CNBC (May 29, 2020, 8:39
AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/29/us-savings-rate-hits-record-33percent-
as-coronavirus-causes-americans-to-stockpile-cash-curb-spending.html.
158 Thomas J. Schoenbaum & Daniel C.K. Chow, The Perils of Economic
Nationalism and a Proposed Pathway to Trade Harmony, 30 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 115, 118 (2019).
159 See Lee Branstetter, Do Trade Restrictions Work? Lessons from Trade
with Japan in the 1980s, PBS (Nov. 20, 2017, 2:29 PM), https://www.pbs.org
/newshour/economy/making-sense/do-trade-restrictions-work-lessons-from-
trade-with-japan-in-the-1980s.
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creation of an asset bubble in Japan. But the deficit between the
United States and Japan continued to grow.160
This approach misunderstands the underlying causes of trade
deficits, which have much more to do with consumer spending and
saving than with trade practices. Rather than considering broad,
macroeconomic reforms, the Trump Administration has
scapegoated China as the cause for the deficit.161 And while China
is the third largest exporter to the United States after Canada and
Mexico,162 closing off trade with China would do little more than
shift Chinese exports to a neighboring country, such as Vietnam.
This began happening early on in the U.S.-China trade war.163
Curbing the deficit will require cuts in government spending and
improvements in consumer savings.164
“If a country consumes more than it produces, it must import
more than it exports. That’s not a rip-off, that’s arithmetic.”165 These
words, spoken by George P. Schultz, former United States Secretary
of Labor, State and Treasury, simplified trade economics in a 2017
editorial in which he, like Feldstein, explained that eliminating a
trade deficit with one country will just shift it to another country
160 See Schoenbaum & Chow, supra note 158, at 119–20 (explaining the
voluntary export restraints imposed on Japan in the 1980s and their unsuccessful
attempt to reduce the trade deficit with Japan).
161 See Calamur, supra, note 11.
162 See Top Trading Partners, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://
www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/toppartners.html (last visited
Nov. 13, 2020).
163 See, e.g., Michelle Jamrisko, Vietnam Tops List of Biggest Winners from
U.S.-China Trade War, BLOOMBERG (June 3, 2019, 6:12 AM), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-03/vietnam-tops-list-of-biggest-
winners-from-u-s-china-trade-war (discussing the trade diversion taking place
from China to Vietnam).
164 See Schoenbaum & Chow, supra note 160, at 121–22 (emphasizing that
the solution to a trade deficit is rather simple, but politically complex: reduce the
federal deficit and incentivize consumer saving).
165 See George P. Shultz & Martin Feldstein, Everything You Need to Know
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unless domestic consumers change their practices or domestic
exporters sell more to that country.166
The United States is the largest importer in the world. Buying
over $2.4 trillion of goods, the United States is the destination for
13.4% of world exports.167 And with a population (in 2019) of over
328 million consumers earning an average of $62,794, snapping up
goods from China, Vietnam, and other less-wealthy countries is
practically a national pastime.
The fact that the United States imports more than any other
country is part of what is feeding its deficit problem. Consumer and
government spending are the two largest components—by far—of
U.S. GDP.168 The other two components—investment and net
exports—make up a far smaller share.169 Consumer spending alone
comprises roughly 70% of U.S. GDP, and with the tax cuts and other
major initiatives of the Trump Administration,170 government
spending is making up much of the remainder.171
A trade deficit is not an indication of economic weakness and
may even be a sign of economic health, considering the fact that it
indicates consumers’ ability to purchase imports from a country
with which they export less, as well as the trust that other countries
have that the country is creditworthy.172 Closing the valve on
exports from China will only open a new valve with another country
166 Id.
167 Jeff Desjardins, These Are the World’s Biggest Importers, WORLD ECON.
FORUM (July 26, 2018), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/07/these-are-the-
worlds-biggest-importers.
168 See Kimberly Amadeo, The Components of GDP Explained, THE
BALANCE, https://www.thebalance.com/components-of-gdp-explanation-
formula-and-chart-3306015 (last updated June 26, 2020).
169 Id.
170 See, e.g., Spending Has Increased $800 Billion Under President Trump,
COMM. FOR A RESPONSIBLE FED. BUDGET (Feb. 12, 2020), http://www.crfb.org
/blogs/spending-has-increased-800-billion-under-president-trump (explaining
that while the rhetoric of the Trump Administration points to budget cuts, actual
spending increased).
171 See Schoenbaum & Chow, supra note 160, at 120 (explaining the key
components of U.S. GDP and how spending far outweighs saving).
172 See John D. Greenwald, At the End of a Long Trade Policy Road, 45 TEX.
INT’L L.J. 157, 168–69 (2009) (explaining that the United States frequently runs
trade deficits despite operating a stable and prosperous economy).
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that produces the goods consumers want, likely at higher costs or
lower quality.
The United States trade deficit with China is the subject of much
ire in the Trump Administration. But it appears more likely that the
growing deficit and strengthening position of China in the global
economy is indicative of larger structural issues that need to be
addressed. Though past administrations have utilized both economic
and diplomatic channels to push China to play by the rules, the
Trump Administration has relied solely upon trade sanctions
(tariffs) to foster compliance. “If one sat down and made a
determined effort, it would be hard to come up with a more
economically wrongheaded, diplomatically toxic, and legally
destructive negotiating position than that presented to China [inMay
2018] by a visiting U.S. trade delegation.”173
China’s rapid rise as an economic powerhouse is inevitable at
this point and should be lauded for the positive effects it has had on
the Chinese population. The question for the United States is
whether they will engage with China in a meaningful way to steer
them toward the rules of the liberal world order, or whether they
would prefer to step aside and allow China, Russia, or another
ambitious country to stake a claim on the future world order.
IV. A NEWWORLD ORDER?
The liberal world order I described above can roughly be divided
into three areas: political, social and economic. The political area
focuses on democracy promotion, rule of law, and governance. The
social area focuses on human rights and basic liberties. And the
economic area focuses on free trade and economic liberalization. I
am only addressing the latter of those three areas in this paper;
however, it is worth mentioning that, if the liberal world order is
going to fall, the economic area will likely be the last element to do
so.174
173 Editorial, Donald Trump’s Irrational Trade Demands on China, FIN.
TIMES (May 7, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/22f89cac-4fbc-11e8-a7a9-
37318e776bab.
174 Robert Kagan, The Twilight of the Liberal World Order, BROOKINGS
INST. (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-twilight-of-the-
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China, and to a lesser extent Russia, pose the most significant
social and political threats to the liberal world order. In both cases,
democracy, accountability, and human rights interfere with their
authoritarian forms of governance.175 However, both of them have
benefited from the economic liberalization associated with that
Order—again, China more so than Russia. While each of those
countries have done little to change their approach in the face of
international opposition when it comes to social and political acts,176
both have operated within the confines of the trade rules set by the
WTO to resolve most trade disputes.177
President Truman’s Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, is
renowned for a number of Cold War strategies, from the Truman
Doctrine to the Marshall Plan to NATO.178 The Truman Doctrine
was considered the United States’ declaration of “cold” war against
communism. In his speech requesting $400 million in funding to
support democracy and fight communism as part of that Doctrine,
President Truman said, “it must be the policy of the United States to
liberal-world-order/ (arguing that the threats posed to the liberal order by China
and Russia are mainly to the political and social elements of that order).
175 Id.
176 See Javier C. Hernandez, Harsh Penalties, Vaguely Defined Crimes:
Hong Kong’s Security Law Explained, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/30/world/asia/hong-kong-security-law-
explain.html (describing a Chinese national security law considered to violate
freedoms in Hong Kong); Daniel Treisman, Why Putin Took Crimea: The
Gambler in the Kremlin, FOREIGN AFF. (May/June 2016), https://
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2016-04-18/why-russian-president-
putin-took-crimea-from-ukraine (analyzing the Russian incursion into Ukraine
and annexation of Crimea).
177 See Panel Report, Russia—Traffic in Transit, WTO Doc. WT/DS512/R
(adopted Apr. 5, 2019) (resolving a case involving a Russian invocation of the
GATT national security exception in its actions on Ukraine); Panel Report, United
States—Tariff Measures on Certain Goods from China, WTO Doc. WT/DS543/R
(Adopted Sept. 15, 2020) (reflecting one of several disputes brought to the WTO
over unilateral U.S. actions against China).
178 Robert Kagan, How Dean Acheson Won the Cold War: Statesmanship,
Morality, and Foreign Policy, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (Sept.
14, 1998), https://carnegieendowment.org/1998/09/14/how-dean-acheson-won-
cold-war-statesmanship-morality-and-foreign-policy-pub-260 (tracing the often-
infamous history of Dean Acheson).
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support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by
armed minorities or by outside pressures.”179
Secretary Acheson defended democracy by creating “situations
of strength” around the world, projecting American influence and
building American-led institutions.180 What was key to the success
of Acheson’s plan was the United States’ willingness to support its
global outreach efforts. In the case of economic order, this meant
maintaining effective institutions that would preserve economic
growth. “The order’s ideological and economic core—the
democracies of Europe and East Asia and the Pacific—had to
remain relatively healthy and relatively confident.”181
The following four decades of the Cold War saw a tremendous
expansion of American power and influence. And despite several
significant military conflicts and economic downturns, Americans
generally supported U.S. efforts to contain communism and promote
democracy.
In the economic sphere, political differences could not stand in
the way of economic relations. Even in the midst of the Cold War,
the United States negotiated a trade treaty with the Soviets,182 just
as today, U.S. firms continue to trade with China, and American
consumers continue to buy Chinese goods in spite of the U.S.-China
trade war. As Robert Kagan recently noted:
Competition in most spheres is necessary and even
healthy. Within the liberal order, China can compete
economically and successfully with the United
States; Russia can thrive in the international
economic order upheld by the liberal powers, even if
it is not itself liberal.183
179 This Day in History: President Truman Announces the Truman Doctrine,
THE HIST. CHANNEL (Nov. 13, 2009), https://www.history.com/this-day-in-
history/truman-doctrine-is-announced.
180 Kagan, supra note 178.
181 Id.
182 SeeKazimierz Grzybowski,United States-Soviet Union Trade Agreement
of 1972, 37 LAW&CONTEMP. PROBS. 395–428 (1972).
183 See Kagan, supra note 174.
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At the end of the Cold War, Francis Fukuyama published a well-
received article entitled, The End of History?,184 in which he
suggested that the defeat of Soviet communism affirmed the
dominance of the liberal world order. Once China peacefully
acceded to the WTO, with full support from the last standing
hegemon, it appeared that even a rising power was willing to abide
by the rules of that order.185 His prediction may have been
premature.186
With the end of the Cold War, Americans lost interest in
promoting liberal values around the world. As I previously noted,
there was no longer a prime directive as there was during the Cold
War. And while the institutions from that period, from the GATT to
NATO, continued to operate, it became ever more apparent that they
would stagnate in the absence of U.S. leadership. The post-Cold
War American administrations kept the organizations afloat but did
little to retain the effectiveness that they had before.
Following the Cold War, more emphasis was placed on regional
economic arrangements rather than unwieldy multilateral
institutions such as the WTO.187 The United States, Europe, Japan,
and some emerging markets such as Chile and Turkey, looked for
arrangements more tailored to their specific needs rather than
focusing on broad-based trade liberalization for all countries.
Ultimately, this led to more liberal trade; however, that
liberalization was occurring in pockets and created a patchwork of
specialized rules and procedures that made trade more complex and
discriminatory. Despite this transition from multilateral to regional
184 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History?, 16 NAT’L INTEREST 3 (1989).
This work was later expanded into a book, see FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF
HISTORY AND THE LASTMAN (Free Press ed., 1992).
185 See Justin Hughes, Globalization, Revising the Terms of Trade, and the
Return of ‘History’, 14 OHIO ST. BUS. L.J. 15, 45–46 (2020) (discussing the belief
in a single political order at the time of China’s WTO accession).
186 See, e.g., Louis Menand, Francis Fukuyama Postpones the End of
History, NEW YORKER (Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine
/2018/09/03/francis-fukuyama-postpones-the-end-of-history# (arguing that
Fukuyama’s predictions were timely but also incorrect).
187 See Cathleen D. Simino-Isaacs et al., World Trade Organization:
Overview and Future Direction,CONG. RES. SERV. 1 (Aug. 21, 2020) (explaining
that the challenges of multilateral trade negotiations have led more countries to
pursue free trade agreements outside of the WTO).
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trade agreements, the consensus was that liberal trade was a net
positive.
The expression “Cold War” had largely fallen out of common
parlance since the breakup of the Soviet Union. But it has been
making a comeback in reference to China, suggesting that, once
again, two economic superpowers will be vying for economic and
political dominance.188 This saber-rattling, however, is unlikely to
result in meaningful outcomes. Unlike the Soviet Union, which
pursued global influence of its economic and political model, China
appears to strive for economic and political success at home, not
abroad.189 Especially in light of the failures of the capitalist system
in response to the 2008 financial crisis and the 2020 Coronavirus
pandemic, China appears intent on proving to itself and to the world
that its model—Chinese socialism—is a refined version of liberalist
principles. But that approach, which requires strong central
leadership and the extensive use of surveillance and
micromanagement, is unlikely to be appealing to more than a
handful of countries.190
There are many similarities between the global health pandemic
and subsequent economic depression of 2020 and the global
financial crisis and subsequent global depression of the 1930s. One
important similarity that is being overlooked is the opportunity that
moment in history provided for the expression of a global vision for
188 See, e.g., Alan Dupont, The US-China Cold War Has Already Started,
DIPLOMAT (July 8, 2020), https://thediplomat.com/2020/07/the-us-china-cold-
war-has-already-started/ (laying out six parallels between the Cold War with the
Soviet Union and the perceived Cold War with China); John Kemp, United States
and China Enter a New Cold War, REUTERS (July 22, 2020, 8:02 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-global-politics-kemp-column/united-states-
and-china-enter-a-new-cold-war-kemp-idUSKCN24N1MT (implying that the
closure of consulates in the U.S. and China indicates the start of a new Cold War);
BenWestcott, There’s Talk of a New Cold War. But China Is not the Soviet Union,
CNN (Jan. 3, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/02/asia/us-china-cold-war-
intl-hnk/index.html (comparing the buildup to the Cold War with the Soviet
Union and China).
189 See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 185 at 47–48.
190 See id. at 34–35 (explaining that, while China has no ideological mission
to take over the world, it does have a model that may be attractive to some
autocratic leaders).
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the future. U.S.-led liberalism emerged out of the 1930s crisis. What
can we expect from the 2020 crisis? I will try to answer that question
in my closing remarks.
The Trump Administration’s attacks on the liberal world order
are not the first such efforts by the United States to undermine that
system. After the United States was accused of violating
international legal conventions by arming rebels to overthrow the
Nicaraguan government, the Reagan Administration withdrew from
the Optional Protocol to the United Nations International Court of
Justice in 1985.191 President Bush likewise withdrew from the
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
after the ICJ ruled against the United States in a death penalty case
in which the prisoner had not been given access to his consulate.192
However, the skirmishes of the former administrations with
international institutions were fought over procedural issues, such
as the jurisdiction of an international tribunal. These differences
kept the United States out of the League of Nations after World War
I and blocked the creation of the International Trade Organization
in 1947.193 However, some institutions have given the United States
benefits that it could not achieve unilaterally, yet without extracting
an ounce of sovereignty. Among these is the World Trade
Organization.
The threat to the liberal global trade institutions that evolved
from the 1940s through today is real and worrisome. The very
institutions that were built to protect against unfair trade are today
being accused of fostering unfair trade.194 Reform of those
institutions is necessary, starting with the GATT rules that govern
191 See Farooq Hassan, A Legal Analysis of the United States’ Attempted
Withdrawal from the Jurisdiction of the World Court in the Proceedings Initiated
by Nicaragua, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 295 (1985).
192 See Frederic L. Kirgis, President Bush’s Determination Regarding
Mexican Nationals and Consular Convention Rights, 9 AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L.
(2005).
193 Douglas A. Irwin, Clashing Over Commerce: A History of U.S. Trade
Policy, 648–49 (2017). https://www.nber.org/system/files/chapters/c13863
/c13863.pdf.
194 See Jomo Kwame Sundaram, Free Trade Agreements, Trade Policy and
Multilateralism, 59 DEVELOPMENT 40, 44 (June 2016) (describing the Trump
Administration’s desire to renegotiate trade agreements on the basis of their
unfairness toward the United States).
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trade and the procedural rules of the WTO Appellate Body that
govern trade disputes. But dismantling the multilateral rules-based
system in an effort to return to unilateralism will bring neither
fairness nor freedom in trade.
B. Multilateral Trade in a Unilateral World
I have suggested in this paper that the GATT rules-based world
trade system has been the most effective tool in maintaining
peaceful trade relations and facilitating economic growth for the
past 75 years. And I have also suggested that recent actions by the
TrumpAdministration and some other countries have challenged the
value of that system as compared to unilateralism and nationalism.
But to fully understand what a return to unilateralism would mean,
we should recall the world in trade before the GATT.
Prior to 1948, when the GATT took effect, trade relations were
managed on a mostly bilateral basis through treaty law. The first
United States trade agreement in the modern sense of the term was
the U.S.-Cuba Reciprocal Trade Agreement in 1934.195 This
followed on the heels of new executive authority to negotiate such
trade agreements, which was given to President Roosevelt through
the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934.196 That Act is
considered the precursor to modern trade law and the impetus for
negotiating the GATT and the stillborn International Trade
Organization.197
The nascent multilateral system that emerged in the 1930s was
built upon the many failures of unilateral and nationalist economic
and trade policies of the past. For instance, the RTAA was in large
part a response to the protectionist Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of
1930, which imposed high tariffs as a means to protect domestic
industry against imports, without taking into account the retaliatory
195 Reciprocal Trade Agreement, Cuba-U.S., Aug. 24, 1934, 49 Stat. 3559
(entered into force Sept. 3, 1934; terminated Oct. 30, 1947).
196 U.S. Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, ch. 474, 48 Stat. 943
(1934) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1351 (1988)).
197 See Peter M. Gerhart, The World Trade Organization and Participatory
Democracy: The Historical Evidence, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 897, 903
(2004) (implying that the RTAA signified an ideological change that opened the
door to the negotiation of a multilateral agreement).
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consequences.198 “The RTAA transformed U.S. trade policy by
reflecting a new understanding—that tariffs have external,
international implications. Tariffs invite or encourage retaliation;
they are a source of friction between countries; and they are bad for
U.S. citizens because they are bad for foreigners. This
transformation is the foundational story behind the establishment of
GATT.”199
Prior periods in history are filled with examples of both liberal
and protectionist trade policies. But in nearly every case, those
policies are shaped by the needs of domestic industries rather than
the potential (though unrealized) gains from liberal trade. A recent
in-depth book by trade scholar Doug Irwin provided a
comprehensive historical analysis of tariffs and trade policy.200 For
our purposes, I will focus on a few key examples of pre-GATT trade
conflicts to exemplify the superiority of special interests and politics
over shared economic growth.
i. Italy’s Integration
In the mid-1800s, continental European countries were pursuing
liberal trade policies through what was known as the “European
Network of Treaties,” a system that applied MFN status to members
of the network.201 Already with some of the lowest tariff levels in
Europe, Italy joined this network by signing a trade treaty with
France in 1863.202 Further economic liberalization in Italy happened
quickly, causing surges of imports that weakened the
competitiveness of Italian textile and heavy industries, especially in
198 Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590 (1930).
199 Gerhart, supra note 197 at 910 (writing that the RTAA shifted America
from an isolationist country to an internationalist country).
200 DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, CLASHING OVER COMMERCE: A HISTORY OF US
TRADE POLICY (Univ. of Chicago Press ed., 2017).
201 Harold James & Kevin O’Rourke, Italy and the First Age of
Globalization, 1861-1940 (Banca D’Italia Euro Sistema, Working Paper No. 16,
2011) (describing Italy’s experimentation with liberal trade policies and its move
toward protectionism).
202 Id.
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the South of the country.203 By 1878, domestic industry convinced
Italy to reverse course and reimpose protective tariffs.204
France quickly retaliated against Italy’s move toward
protectionism, despite their trade treaty. Protectionist tariffs in
France devastated the Italian silk and wine industries and caused a
decline in Italian exports to France of 57% between 1887 and
1897.205 Ultimately, Italy backed down from their high tariffs and
France reciprocated. The Italy-France case demonstrates the effects
of unilateral action on tariffs without regard for extraterritorial
effects.
ii. Canada’s Confederacy
The second example involves a case eerily similar to the one that
occurred in mid-2020.206 In 1854, the United States entered into a
reciprocity treaty with Canada, which was a British colony at the
time. The Canadians had been pushing the Crown for more control
over their economy since the early 1800s. After the British Corn
Laws and Navigation Acts were repealed207 in 1846 and 1849,
respectively, Canada was given autonomy to set its own tariff
levels.208 In addition to those changes in Britain, Canadians were
increasingly envious of the economic growth being enjoyed by their
southern neighbor. “The people of Canada saw, with increasing
discontent, the rapid strides of the United States in wealth.”209
203 Id. (describing the Commission established to evaluate the impact of trade
liberalization on Italian industries).
204 Id. (explaining that tariffs on yarn rose to 27%, wheat to 25%, and
similarly large increases in steel and iron).
205 Id. at 8.
206 See Jeanne Whalen & Amanda Coletta, Trump Re-Imposes Tariffs on
Canadian Aluminum, Prompting Trudeau to Vow Retaliation, WASH. POST (Aug.
6, 2020, 8:08 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/08/06
/trump-canada-aluminum-tariffs/ (describing the President’s decision to impose
tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from Canada despite the recent signing of
a new trade deal with that country).
207 Fandl, supra note 80.
208 Frederick E. Haynes, The Reciprocity Treaty with Canada of 1854, 7
PUBLICATIONS OF THE AM. ECON. ASSOC. 7, 9–10 (1892) (describing the push for
Canadian economic independence).
209 Id. at 10.
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Accordingly, in 1847, Canada lowered its tariff on U.S. goods
from 12.5% to 7.5% (and raised tariffs on British imports from 5%
to 7.5%).210 That step led to the formal signing of the Reciprocal
Treaty in 1854, eliminating tariffs on most goods between the
United States and Canada.211 Trade during the period 1851 to 1861
grew at its fastest pace ever, increasing from $19 million in 1851 to
$51 million in 1861.212 However, that shared economic prosperity
would be short-lived.
In the midst of the U.S. Civil War, the United States became
aggravated that Canada had been building coastal vessels used by
the Confederacy to raid Union commerce, and thus it abrogated the
treaty in 1866—the one and only time in United States history that
it has abrogated a trade treaty.213 The period between 1861 and 1871,
accordingly, saw the smallest increase in cross-border trade since
the parties began trading in the 1830s.214 It is useful to consider that
a conflict such as this would be capable of resolution in the context
of the WTO. It may have been an ideal case for the invocation of the
national security exemption, which allows a country to temporarily
suspend trade concessions in the event of war or threat to national
security.215 Because these were, after all, “the inevitable commercial
disturbances of a time of war.”216 The two countries ended the
210 Id. at 12 (describing the desire to match the rates between the UK and the
United States).
211 Id. at 17–18 (explaining that the treaty took effect in 1855, after the
United States was convinced of Canada’s changes to its economy).
212 Id. at 31.
213 Lawrence Herman et al., Panel Discussion—The Current State of
NAFTA, 43 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 57, 78 (2019).
214 Haynes, supra note 208, at 31–32 (describing a total trade increase of only
$8 million).
215 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art.
XXI, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154; see also Kevin J. Fandl, National
Security Tariffs: A Threat to Effective Trade Policy, 23 U. PA. J. BUS. L.
(forthcoming 2021) (providing a comprehensive analysis of the national security
exception in GATT law).
216 Haynes, supra note 208, at 19 (explaining that the onset of the Civil War
doomed the Treaty).
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century with back and forth retaliatory tariffs that would continue
for decades.217
iii. Last Call for Protectionism
The final example I will provide of trade disputes prior to the
modern liberal world order is more widely known among
Americans, perhaps due to its infamous reference in the 1980s cult
classic film, Ferris Bueller’s Day Off. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff
Act of 1930 is an iconic piece of ill-timed legislation that was meant
to bring prosperity through protection to the United States.218
Leading up to the 1930 Tariff Act, import duties were largely in the
hands of congressmen who, by and large, sought protection for
industries in their districts and used a process of “log-rolling” to
trade votes for similar protection in other districts.219 Prior to
passage of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913, which established the
federal income tax, tariffs were the main source of revenue for the
federal government and thus were a critical component of
congressional authority.220 Yet the progressives in the early
twentieth century saw a need to reign in corruption and defer tariff
policy to experts.
217 See, e.g., McKinley Tariff Act, ch. 1244, No. 567 (1890); Dingley Tariff
Act, ch. 10-11, No. 151. (1897).
218 Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 338(a), 46 Stat. 704 (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1338(a)) (“The President when he finds that the public interest will be served
shall by proclamation specify and declare new or additional duties as hereinafter
provided upon articles wholly or in part the growth or product of, or imported in
a vessel of, any foreign country whenever he shall find as a fact that such
country—(1) Imposes, directly or indirectly, upon the disposition in or
transportation in transit through or reexportation from such country of any article
wholly or in part the growth or product of the United States any unreasonable
charge, exaction, regulation, or limitation which is not equally enforced upon the
like articles of every foreign country; or (2) Discriminates in fact against the
commerce of the United States . . . .”).
219 Daniel K. Tarullo, Law and Politics in Twentieth Century Tariff History,
34 UCLAL. REV. 285, 296–97 (1986) (describing the corrupt politics involved in
trading votes for protective tariffs).
220 U.S. Const. amend. XVI (1913); Joseph R. Fishkin et al., Common
Interpretation: The Sixteenth Amendment, INTERACTIVE CONSTITUTION (2020),
https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/interpretation/amendment-
xvi/interps/139).
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To achieve this goal, Congress first established the Tariff
Commission, an independent agency meant to provide expert advice
on reasonable levels of tariffs.221 And second, six years later,
Congress passed the “flexible tariff provision” (“FTP”) as part of
the Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act of 1922, which enabled the
President to adjust tariffs in accordance with a standard set by
Congress.222 That provision was upheld by the United States
Supreme Court as a viable delegation of power given the intelligible
principle in place for determining the appropriate tariff level.223
However, these new constraints were not enough to keep politics out
of trade policy.
When Republican Herbert Hoover came to office in 1928, he
fought to keep his promise to protect farmers and other industries
hurt by recent changes in the global economy.224 In April 1929,
Hoover asked Congress for a new tariff bill that would protect
agricultural interests and that would also revise the FTP to
strengthen the President’s power to adjust tariff rates as he saw fit,
effectively taking away congressional power over tariff rates.225
Democrats attempted to stop this expansion in power, but Hoover
insisted, “No provision for the FTP, then no tariff bill.”226
Ultimately, in June 1930, the Tariff Act, better known as the Smoot-
Hawley Tariff Act, was enacted, giving Hoover expanded FTP
powers, including the ability to raise or lower tariffs by as much as
221 19 U.S.C. § 2231 (2016); William S. Culbertson, The Tariff Commission
and Its Work, THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, 57–65 (Jan. 1918). Established
September 8, 1916 and renamed the “United States International Trade
Commission” by § 171 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2231.
222 Tariff Act of 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-318, § 315, 42 Stat. 858, 942-43
(1922); SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES TARIFF COMMISSION,
Washington Government Printing Office, 1-99 at 2 (1922).
223 J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 404, 413 (1928)
(“It may be that it is difficult to fix with exactness this difference, but the
difference which is sought in the statute is perfectly clear and perfectly
intelligible.”).
224 Kumiko Koyama, The Passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act: Why Did
the President Sign the Bill?, 21 J. OF POL’Y HIST. 163, 172 (2009).
225 Id. at 172–73.
226 Id. at 173 (describing the back and forth between congress and Hoover
over the tariff act).
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50% of their current value.227 The Act also raised tariffs on over
20,000 different imports.
Just prior to signing the bill, Hoover was urged by a vocal
opposition group to veto the significant increases in tariffs that were
included. That opposition included the American economists,
bankers and other business professionals who were concerned about
likely retaliation by the United States’ trade partners.228 However,
given the fact that Hoover got what he wanted with the expanded
FTP powers, and considering that the economy was in freefall and
this would likely be his last chance to secure those tariff powers,
Hoover signed the bill.229
Some historians believe that passage of the Smoot-Hawley
Tariff Act may have had the unintended consequence of buoying
Adolf Hitler’s rise to power and Japan’s incursion into China at the
onset of World War II.230 And while the Great Depression can be
tied to the stock market crash in October 1929, many economists
point to the proposed Smoot-Hawley tariffs earlier in 1929 as cause
to frighten the market toward a crash.231 But one thing is certain—
the unilateral actions of the Hoover Administration and the
protectionist Republican Congress in 1930 stifled world trade and
deepened the economic fallout from the stock market collapse.
This final protectionist act immediately preceded the
establishment of the multilateral rules-based system that we know
today.232 Hoover and the Republican majority in Congress were
227 Id. at 174 (describing the provisions of the Tariff Act of 1930 affecting
the FTP).
228 Id. at 178 (highlighting the domestic battle to scale back the tariffs in the
midst of a collapsing economy).
229 Id. (noting that, at this point in history, Republicans were more trade
protectionist than Democrats).
230 See Andrew Glass, Hoover Signs Smoot-Hawley Act, June 17, 1930,
POLITICO (June 17, 2014, 12:01 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2014/06
/this-day-in-politics-herbert-hoover-smoot-hawley-act-107908.
231 See Alan Reynolds, What Do We Know About the Great Crash?, NAT’L
REV., (Nov. 9, 1979) (arguing that the proposed Tariff Act of 1930 likely set off
alarm bells in stock markets, setting course for an economic collapse).
232 See Douglas A. Irwin, From Smoot-Hawley to Reciprocal Trade
Agreements: Changing the Course of U.S. Trade Policy in the 1930s, inMICHAEL
D.BORDO,CLAUDIAGOLDEN&EUGENEN.WHITE, THEDEFININGMOMENT: THE
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replaced by the progressive Democrat Franklin Delano Roosevelt
and a new slate of progressive Democrats in Congress.233 Roosevelt
won the support of Congress to enact the Reciprocal Trade
Agreements Act in 1934 (“RTAA”),234 which largely replaced the
hard-fought FTP.235 The main distinction between the two was that
Roosevelt was expected and empowered to negotiate tariff
reductions on a reciprocal basis with trade partners, laying the
groundwork for a multilateral framework that would be negotiated
a few years later, the GATT.
The RTAA’s constitutionality rests on the foundations
established in the Hampton challenge to the FTP in 1928. The first
case to question the validity of the delegation of congressional trade
authority to the Executive was in the 1959 Starkist case, which
upheld the validity of the delegation.236 Trade scholar Douglas Irwin
concluded that, “[t]he RTAA fundamentally transformed not only
the process but also the course of U.S. trade policy.”237 Irwin made
the case that the consolidation of tariff power—central to trade
policy—in a single Executive laid the ground work for what would
ultimately convert Republicans from a protectionist party to a free
trade party.238
What we learn from these case studies is that politics have
historically superseded wise trade policy decisions. And while we
may never eliminate politics from effective trade policy, we can
mitigate its influence with good governance and rules that constrain
GREAT DEPRESSION AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
325 (1998).
233 See William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Campaigns and
Elections, UVA MILLER CTR., https://millercenter.org/president/fdroosevelt
/campaigns-and-elections (last visited Nov. 10, 2020).
234 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, ch. 474, 48 Stat. 943 (1934), adding
sec. 350 to Tariff Act of 1930 (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1351 (1982)).
235 For a complete comparative analysis of the FTP and the RTAA, see
Tarullo, supra note 212, at 347–58.
236 Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. United States, 275 F.2d 472, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1959).
237 Douglas A. Irwin & Randall S. Kroszner, Interests, Institutions, and
Ideology in Securing Policy Change: The Republican Conversion to Trade
Liberalization After Smoot-Hawley, 42 J. L. & ECON. 643, 644 (1999) (suggesting
that the broader executive power granted by the RTAA garnered republican
support for free trade, including the GATT).
238 Id. at 648–49.
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all players equally. “[T]he history of civilization may be described
as a gradual evolution from a power-oriented approach, in the state
of nature, towards a rules-oriented approach.”239
Economist Paul Krugman famously quipped, “[i]f economists
ruled the world, there would be no need for a World Trade
Organization.”240 The basic theorem of economics posits that liberal
trade will benefit all participants and maximize efficiency in the
global economy. Of course, economists do not rule the world—
politicians do, with their own unique interests.241 Thus, if our goal
is the best possible trade policy for shared global economic growth,
the best possible tool to get us there is a global system of governance
and rules that constrain politicians.
That sentiment was widely agreed upon throughout the Cold
War and even in the decades after, despite the push for more narrow
bilateral agreements, often with political ends in mind. Trade
disputes have continued to arise, but these disputes have been
resolved peacefully through the former GATT and now WTO
dispute settlement system. Even the current trade war between the
United States and China is being fought both within and outside of
the WTO.
The concern today is not that China’s rise will destroy trade
institutions. In fact, their economic growth quickly led to their desire
to join that very system. Rather, it is our faith in those institutions
and their relevance to trade relations that is in doubt. The
cooperative, multilateral approach of past (pre-Trump)
administrations set politics aside in the interest of maintaining the
system that we built.242 Yet during the Trump Administration,
politics have been front and center in the development of trade
239 John H. Jackson, The Crumbling Institutions of the Liberal Trade System,
12 J. WORLD TRADE L. 93, 99 (1978).
240 Paul Krugman, What Should Trade Negotiators Negotiate About?, 35 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 113, 113 (1997).
241 See Joost Pauwelyn, The Transformation of World Trade, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 10–11 (2005) (showing how politics and economics impact the global
trading system).
242 See, e.g., Martin Crutsinger, Bush Decides to Lift Steep Steel Tariffs,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 4, 2003), https://www.iatp.org/news/bush-decides-to-
lift-steep-steel-tariffs (explaining that then President George W. Bush wanted to
avoid a trade war when lifting foreign steel tariffs).
110 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
policy; whether it is the trade deficit with China, the “lost” cases at
the WTO, or the ineffective trade agreements previous
administrations signed, there is a clear movement away from
multilateralism and toward nationalism.
Has the United States already left behind the liberal multilateral
approach to trade? One author recently suggested that “[t]he rule-
based system of the WTO still exists in name, but, for relations with
the United States, it is largely irrelevant in practice.”243 Others have
claimed that the Trump Administration’s actions toward the WTO
suggest a desire to move back to a pre-GATT world in which
nationalism and protectionism rule the global trading system.244 In
the next section, I will discuss the current state of affairs with respect
to trade.
V. WHERE AREWENOW?
When Frank Fukuyama boldly declared at the end of the Cold
War that we were at the end of history,245 perhaps what was really
happening was that we were opening a new chapter in history—one
that has become ambivalent toward the institutions that sustained the
peace for much of the twentieth century. In the three decades since,
we have seen deeper regional integration in Europe and Asia,246
243 Gregory Shaffer, A Tragedy in the Making? The Decline of Law and the
Return of Power in International Trade Relations, 44 YALE J. OF INT’L L. ONLINE
37, 42 (2019), https://cpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/campuspress-test.yale.edu/dist
/8/1581/files/2019/02/5_Shaffer_YJIL-Symposium_A-Tragedy-in-the-Making
_12.07.18-23keh7s.pdf (discussing the decline in rules-based dispute resolution
following unilateral actions by the Trump Administration).
244 See, e.g., Daniel C.K. Chow, Ian M. Sheldon & William McGuire, The
Revival of Economic Nationalism and the Global Trading System, 40 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2133, 2168–69 (2019) (contending that the United States is moving
towards a protectionist posture).
245 FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LASTMAN (1992).
246 Consider the expansion of the European Union to include former Soviet
states in Eastern Europe, and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Agreement.
Rikard Jozwiak, EU, Ex-Soviet Republics to Extend Partnership Beyond 2020,
RADIO FREE EUROPE (Apr. 5, 2019, 12:39 PM), https://www.rferl.org/a/eu-ex-
soviet-republics-to-extend-partnership-beyond-2020/29863540.html; Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., https://
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stronger trade ties in the Americas,247 and of course the
establishment of the WTO, the crowning achievement of the global
economic system. The combination of regional integration and
global governance in trade have helped to fight back the nationalist
tendencies of individual states. Cooperative action among countries
to facilitate economic opportunity, even if some sectors are more
exposed to foreign competition than before, became acceptable as
the cost of aggregate economic growth. Trade policy was set to
cruise control for much of the last two decades.
This ambivalence toward maintaining institutions of global trade
is evident in the naïve approach that American and European leaders
took to the changes occurring in the 1990s. “When we talk about
foreign policy, I think we too often overlook the fact that many of
the negative trends we see today are the direct result of our choices
during the 1990s and early 2000s.”248 For instance, the end of the
Cold War left former Soviet republics out in the cold with no plan
to transition to peaceful democracy. Those problems have festered
into crises like the ones we see today in Belarus.249 China told the
West that it was committed to democratizing from “the bottom up,”
blinding Western leaders to the possibility that a rising economic
power could make false promises in exchange for desired outcomes.
And the war on terror, launched in 2001, was the result of overly
optimistic and naïve expectations that democracy would take hold
ustr.gov/issue-areas/trade-organizations/asia-pacific-economic-cooperation-apec
(last visited Nov. 21, 2020).
247 Consider, for instance, the North American Free Trade Agreement and
the Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement. North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), INT’L TRADE ADMIN., https://
www.trade.gov/north-american-free-trade-agreement-nafta (last visited Nov. 21,
2020); CAFTA-DR (Dominican Republic-Central America FTA), OFF. OF THE
U.S. TRADE REP., https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-
dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta (last visited Nov. 21, 2020).
248 Tom McTague, Remember the ‘90s, Don’t Long for a Return, THE
ATLANTIC (Aug. 20, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive
/2020/08/brexit-trump-china-90s-golden-era/615406/.
249 See Frederik Pleitgen et al., Belarus Opposition Protests Begin Amid
Heavy Police Presence, CNN (Aug. 23, 2020, 2:33 PM), https://www.cnn.com
/2020/08/23/europe/belarus-protest-sunday-intl/index.html (describing protests
in response to the disputed election of President Lukashenko).
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in countries that lacked credible democratic institutions or
experience with this type of governance.
These failures in foreign policy exposed the limits of the liberal
world order. During this period, many leaders came to the
conclusion that “multilateralism and liberal interventionism are
merely convenient, not essential,”250 and not every state leader was
ready to abandon their grip on power in order to fully integrate into
the liberal order. Similarly, the 2008 financial crisis, the Greek debt
default, Brexit, and the 2020 global health pandemic and economic
crisis, among other things, exemplified the limits of the liberal
economic order to maintain the stability that it promised. What had
become apparent was that liberalism had limits.
The election of Donald Trump in 2016 and his subsequent
actions to retract American leadership on the world stage led many
commentators to suggest that the liberal world order had ended.
Richard Haas at the Council on Foreign Relations likened this
moment to the fall of the Holy Roman Empire:
After a run of nearly one thousand years, quipped the
French philosopher and writer Voltaire, the fading
Holy Roman Empire was neither holy nor Roman nor
an empire. Today, some two and a half centuries
later, the problem, to paraphrase Voltaire, is that the
fading liberal world order is neither liberal nor
worldwide nor orderly.251
Neoconservative commentator Robert Kagan argued that the Trump
Administration would pivot away from the United States’ prior role
as a protector of the liberal economic order, instead returning to the
narrow, realist approach of the pre-twentieth century.252
But perhaps Trump is only the latest leader to channel the
frustration with past failures in foreign policy that have been
growing since the 1990s. Tom McTague recently wrote in The
250 See McTague, supra note 248 (explaining that many of the challenges to
liberalism in 2020 were seeded in the 1990s).
251 Richard Haas, Liberal World Order, R.I.P., PROJECT SYNDICATE (Mar.
21, 2018), https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/end-of-liberal-world-
order-by-richard-n--haass-2018-03?barrier=accesspaylog.
252 Kagan, supra note 174 (positing that Russia and China pose the most
significant threats to the liberal world order that the United States has maintained
for decades).
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Atlantic that “Trump is not the cause of the new world, but the
consequence of the old one’s failures.”253 Others have suggested that
we may be reverting back to a realist approach to foreign policy and
trade. Princeton Scholar Stephen Kotkin argued that the rise and
amazing success of liberalism last century may have been only an
aberration to the default of nations—realism.254
Neorealist theory, the competitor to liberalism, is premised on
two key facets: 1) balance of power and; 2) hegemony.255 During
the Cold War, the balance of power was as simple and
straightforward as the battle between the United States and the
Soviet Union. And hegemony was sought by those great powers
with incentives, such as financial support or trade.256 This theory
also suggests that, in the absence of the American leadership that
both created and maintained this world order, countries will return
to a state of isolationism similar to that of the 1930s and early 1940s,
fueled by “economic rivalry, security dilemmas, arms races, hyper-
nationalism, balancing alliances, and ultimately the threat of
war.”257 Thus, according to neorealism, the end of the Cold War
should signal a return to the political anarchy of the past.
However, the origins of the liberal world order predate the onset
of the Cold War and thus the order that prevailed during that period
of time cannot be tied to a balance of power and hegemony alone.
Scholar Thomas Wright advocated for a realignment of the liberal
world order following the end of the Cold War. He said, “China and
Russia are very different powers with different strategies, but they
share the objective of targeting free and open societies to make the
253 McTague, supra note 248.
254 Stephen Kotkin, Realist World: The Players Change, but the Game
Remains, 97 FOREIGN AFF. 10, 15 (2018) (contending that the rise and fall of
powers is inevitable and that liberalism’s recent faltering has opened the door for
realism on the global stage).
255 Deudney and Ikenberry, supra note 23 at 179–80.
256 See, e.g., Kosmas Tsokhas, The Political Economy of Cuban Dependence
on the Soviet Union, 9 THEORY AND SOC’Y 319, 320–21 (1980) (discussing how
the Soviet Union used trade to influence Cuba’s foreign policy).
257 Deudney and Ikenberry, supra note 23, at 180.
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world a safer place for authoritarianism.”258 In that piece, Wright
suggested that the liberal world order followed by President Obama
and his predecessors was one that sought to accommodate and even
open the door to the integration of Russia and China into that
order.259 To the contrary, Wright argues that China and Russia are
actively pursuing mechanisms, including through the use of
monitoring technology, to control their populations in exchange for
broad programs such as eliminating poverty and crime, and that they
will try to export these ideas to other would-be authoritarians around
the world.260 Reimagining the liberal world order as a global
security apparatus that protects the ideas of democracy, capitalism,
and freedom by unifying allies in a mutual accord similar to NATO
may be the best way to protect against the illiberal rise of China and
Russia.
What is clear today is that, in the face of a global health
pandemic and economic catastrophe, countries are retreating to their
corners and trying to keep their domestic economies from complete
collapse. Protectionism in the form of both new trade restrictions261
and military buildups262 have replaced reliance on cooperative
agendas. Much as nationalists in 1930 saw global integration as a
threat to domestic economic growth and stability, many political
leaders today—both liberal and conservative—go out of their way
258 Thomas Wright, The Return to Great-Power Rivalry Was Inevitable, THE
ATLANTIC (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive
/2018/09/liberal-international-order-free-world-trump-authoritarianism/569881/.
259 Id.
260 Id. (using Turkey and Hungary as examples of where such technology
might be capitalized upon).
261 See, e.g., Ana Swanson & Ian Austen, Trump Reinstates Tariff on
Canadian Aluminum, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com
/2020/08/06/business/economy/trump-canadian-aluminum-tariffs.html
(describing the reinstatement of tariffs even after recently concluding the USMCA
agreement).
262 See, e.g., Chun Han Wong & Joyu Wang, Fearing Hong Kong’s Fate,
Taiwan Moves to Bolster its Military Against China, WALL ST. J., (Aug. 30, 2020,
12:07 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/fearing-hong-kongs-fate-taiwan-
moves-to-bolster-its-military-against-china-11598803656.
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to promote nationalism as the cure for the failures of
globalization.263
VI. WHERE AREWEGOING NEXT?
One of the foremost international relations scholars of our time,
G. John Ikenberry, who eloquently explained what the liberal world
order was in the 1990s, examined the situation as of 2020 and
concluded that this may be the year that brings an end to that order.
“Not since the 1930s has the world been this bereft of even the most
rudimentary forms of cooperation.”264 In that article, Ikenberry
explains that the “liberal world order is collapsing because its
leading patrons, starting with the United States, have given up on
it.”265
This is an ideological challenge that dwarfs any the
United States faced during the Cold War. Then,
communism never had any real traction politically.
Today’s neo-authoritarianism has gone viral. We
should not overstate its foothold in America—the
vast majority of Republicans do not share the
president’s ideology even if they support him
politically—but this challenge is not confined to the
foreign-policy arena. Americans must figure out how
to preserve liberty at home, amid political and
technological shifts, while also pushing back against
its great power rivals.266
263 See, e.g., Christina Pazzanese, In Europe, Nationalism Rising, HARV.
GAZETTE (Feb. 27, 2017), https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2017/02/in-
europe-nationalisms-rising/ (discussing the rise of political figures such as Marine
le Pen in France, Geert Wilders in the Netherlands and Donald Trump in the
United States as promoting nationalism); Jack Snyder, The Broken Bargain: How
Nationalism Came Back, FOR. AFF., (March/April 2019), https://
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2019-02-12/broken-bargain.
264 Ikenberry, supra note 72, at 133.
265 Id.
266 Wright, supra note 258 (arguing that the accommodating approach of the
liberal world order should be set aside in favor of an alliance of allies who
advocate for the values of democracy, trade, and freedom, and fight
authoritarianism).
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But there is hope for a change in course. The demise of the liberal
world order that has carried the world forward and kept
authoritarianism contained for nearly a century is not inevitable.
If Donald Trump is the executioner-in-waiting of the liberal
world order, is Joe Biden its savior? It may be convenient to consider
the 2020 election cycle as a decision between abandoning
multilateralism and turning inward and saving the global system.
But the approach of both Trump and Biden with respect to the liberal
economic order may be more similar than some would like to
recognize. Recall that Joe Biden had a hand in many of the failures
of the post-Cold War era that I discussed above.267 His record on
liberal trade is far more moderate than many of his former
challengers for the presidential nomination.
As I write this article in the summer of 2020, any discussion of
a President Biden’s position on trade policy would be speculation.
However, given Biden’s long history in both the legislature and as
Vice President, there are some macro ideas that we can use to assess
his vision for future trade policy.
Candidate Biden’s stated economic policy, “Made in All of
America,” includes many of the same elements found in Trump’s
policy, including incentivizing a return to stateside manufacturing
and reinvestment in union-driven industries.268 His platform
promises the creation of “millions of new manufacturing and
innovation jobs throughout all of America.”269 His approach, similar
to the Trump Administration’s, seeks to bring supply chains back to
267 See Dominic Tierney, In Search of the Biden Doctrine, FOR. POL’Y RES.
INST. (Nov. 9, 2020), https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/11/in-search-of-the-
biden-doctrine/ (describing Biden as inconsistent in his post-Cold War foreign
policy votes in the Senate). See also Thomas Wright, The Quiet Reformation of
Biden’s Foreign Policy, BROOKINGS (Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu
/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/03/20/the-quiet-reformation-of-bidens-foreign-
policy/ (explaining that Biden is updating his foreign policy views since his role
as Vice President).
268 The Biden Plan to Ensure the Future Is “Made in All of America” by All
of America’s Workers, BIDEN HARRIS, https://joebiden.com/made-in-america/#
(last visited Aug. 27, 2020).
269 Id.
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America.270 This promise, however, may conflict with the reality of
global trade today.271
When Biden takes office, the domestic economy will still be in
recovery mode and may be for years to come. Admittedly, this will
likely drive the Biden Administration to focus on investments in
infrastructure, education and jobs at home. In his own words, “I
won’t enter into any new trade agreements until we’ve made major
investments here at home, in our workers and our communities—
equipping them to compete and win in the global economy.”272 But,
as Center for Strategic and International Studies trade expert Bill
Reinsch observed, “Trump is going to leave a lot of trade debris out
there,” and Biden will need to address it quickly.273
CONCLUSION
The future of the liberal world order depends on the United
States. Undoubtedly it requires the support and cooperation of many
other countries as well; however, U.S. leadership has been
indispensable in setting the moral compass for the liberal values that
make the system so attractive. In the words of the World Economic
Forum:
The present world order has been forged by many
hands and peoples, but the role of the United States
in both shaping and defending it has been critical.
American military power, the dynamism of the U.S.
economy and the great number of close alliances and
friendships that the United States enjoys with other
270 Id.
271 See Victoria Craig, Why Bringing Manufacturing Jobs to the U.S. from
China Is “Highly Unlikely”, MARKETPLACE (Aug. 27, 2020), https://
www.marketplace.org/2020/08/27/trump-manufacturing-jobs-china-trade-war-
deal/ (explaining how tariffs on China meant to shift supply chains to the United
States have only shifted them to other low-labor cost countries).
272 Biden for President, Response to Questions from United Steelworkers,
UNITED STEEL WORKERS (May 17, 2020), https://www.uswvoices.org/endorsed-
candidates/biden/BidenUSWQuestionnaire.pdf.
273 Gavin Bade, For Biden, Untangling Trump’s Trade Wars Takes Backseat
to Economy, POLITICO (Aug. 20, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.politico.com/news
/2020/08/20/for-biden-untangling-trumps-trade-wars-takes-backseat-to-
economy-398748.
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powers and peoples have provided the critical
architecture in which this liberal world order has
flourished. A weakening of America’s commitment
or its capabilities, or both, would invariably lead to
its collapse.274
In that same report, the authors argued that Americans by and large
support the fundamental ideas of the liberal world order—freedom,
democracy, and free trade.275 But what they have lost since the end
of the Cold War is “a sense of strategy and purpose” in foreign
policy.276 The war on terror filled that gap for a period of time, but
the poor strategic decisions and the minimal return on investment of
American lives and funding diluted support for that purpose.
The “threat” on the horizon today is the economic and political
rise of China. Though China has done little to merit the title of
“threat,” it has quickly developed the economic and political clout
to challenge the liberal world order’s unitary status as the world’s
preferred system of governance. The “China Model” has proven
effective in minimizing the losses of the 2008 and 2020 economic
crises. And the less intrusive foreign policy approach of economic
investment without political conditions may ultimately be an
attractive model for other states that dislike the more intrusive
American model.
Of course, there are those who believe that the liberal world
order is not worth protecting. Some have called it “imperialism,”277
while others have argued that our nostalgia for this system ignores
the many illiberal outcomes and failures that it entailed in its post-
1945 existence.278 And some others argue that there is no such thing
274 Strengthening the Liberal World Order, WORLD ECON. FORUM 2 (Apr.
2016), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_US_GAC_Strengthening_Liberal
_World_Order_White_Paper_US.pdf.
275 Id. at 2–3.
276 Id. at 3.
277 See Inderjeet Parmar, The US-Led Liberal Order: Imperialism by Another
Name?, 94 INT’L AFF. 151 (2018) (suggesting that liberal internationalism is a
means of justifying imperial conquest).
278 Patrick Porter, A World Imagined: Nostalgia and Liberal Order, CATO
INST. POL’Y ANALYSIS NO. 843 (2018) (contending that the liberal world order
conflates intentions with outcomes and is not truly a world ordering system).
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as a liberal world order.279 There is reason to take these arguments
seriously. But it would be a mistake to dismiss the value of the rules-
based global institutions established last century in guiding, through
both consent and at times coercion, the pursuit of liberal values. And
it would be naïve to think that the removal of those rules would not
cause a devolution into nationalism and conflict.
The United States took bold and decisive action following
World War II to bring the world together under its own vision of
stability and peace. That system proved its weight in gold by
removing the incentives and increasing the costs of going to war,
and by paving the way to global economic growth. Significant dust
has accumulated on the institutions that we helped to build, and
reform is necessary. But especially now—in the face of global crises
such as climate change, health pandemics, and the resurgence of
racism—it is those liberal institutions that will guide us toward
effective resolutions with broad support and engagement. This is
precisely the moment when the world needs leadership, and if the
past is any guide, the United States must once again calibrate its
moral compass and be the shining beacon on the hill to guide the
world forward.
The economic power of the United States in the 1940s was
unmatched and served both as an example of what other countries
could become if they followed in American footsteps, as well as a
powerful hammer to motivate compliance with the rules that we set
in place. The Soviets never matched that economic power, thus
relying on military and political strategy to secure their power.
Today, that economic power is still unmatched, but China is
catching up fast. If the United States expects to continue profiting
from its prime position within the liberal world order, it will need to
work cooperatively to contain China’s acts that are outside of those
rules. Failure to reign in those aberrations, from trade protectionism
to human rights abuses, will further weaken support for the rules-
based system and make such actions more justifiable by other
authoritarian regimes.
279 Michael N. Barnett, The End of a Liberal International Order that Never
Existed, THE GLOBAL BLOG (Apr. 16, 2019), https://theglobal.blog/2019/04/16
/the-end-of-a-liberal-international-order-that-never-existed/ (discussing the lack
of liberal values within the global institutions built as part of this period in
history).
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If there is only one takeaway from this discussion, it should be
that we are currently at a key moment in our history, which will
determine the future of the world order as we know it. But with a
better understanding of how we got here and the reasons that we
built the liberal world order in the first place, we may just have a
better appreciation for its essential nature. Because of our actions in
the past, the future is in our hands. One day soon, it may not be.
